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FOREWORD—ANTHROPOCENIC DISRUPTION, 
COMMUNITY RESILIENCE AND LAW 
René Reich-Graefe* 
“It would be . . . foolish for an individual to give up living upon 
learning he is mortal, or to refuse medicine early in the course of a 
dangerous illness.”1 
–Benjamin H. Strauss, Scott Kulp & Anders Levermann 
Since the First Agricultural (or Neolithic) Revolution, humans have 
been the primary agents of both biospheric and sociospheric change.  
Modern human societies evolved in an ecosystem of abundance in which 
human agency and consumption could conveniently ignore the problem 
 
* Professor of Law, Western New England University School of Law.  LL.B. (equivalent), 
Free University of Berlin School of Law, 1996.  LL.M., University of Connecticut School of 
Law, 1997.  The general themes and commentary in this Foreword have been presented during 
the Western New England Law Review Symposium, Anthropocenic Disruption, Community 
Resilience and Law, at the Western New England University School of Law on October 26, 
2018 and at the ClassCrits X Annual Conference at Tulane University Law School on November 
10, 2017.  I would like to thank the Volume 41 Board of Editors and Staff of the Western New 
England Law Review—particularly its Editor-in-Chief, Zachary Broughton, and Senior Articles 
Editor, Katharine Shove—for expertly and tirelessly organizing the 2018 Law Review 
Symposium, as well as the participants of the Symposium and of the 2017 ClassCrits 
Conference for their helpful comments and suggestions.  I also thank Julius Graefe for helping 
me understand the Anthropocenic marginalization and displacement effects on vulnerable 
coastal populations today (particularly, in terms of “climate gentrification”) as current 
bellwethers of our full-scale Anthropocenic disruption tomorrow (particularly, because of 
climate change and resultant sea-level rise).  As always, my gratitude goes to Barbara Reich 
who, in innumerable ways, has heard this all before and, still, remains willing to listen and talk 
with me.  All errors, omissions, and limitations are mine. 
1. Benjamin H. Strauss et al., Reply to Boyd et al.: Large Long-Term Sea Level 
Projections Do Not Mean Giving Up on Coastal Cities, 113 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. E1330, 
E1330 (2016); see also Ezra Boyd et al., Although Critical, Carbon Choices Alone Do Not 
Determine the Fate of Coastal Cities, 113 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. E1329, E1329 (2016) 
(responding to Benjamin H. Strauss et al., Carbon Choices Determine US Cities Committed to 
Futures Below Sea Level, 112 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 13508 (2015), https://www.pnas.org/
content/pnas/112/44/13508.full.pdf [hereinafter Carbon Choices]). 
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of natural capital.2  At today’s peak of humanity, first-world humans 
personally produce virtually nothing to sustain their respective individual 
lives.3  Instead, distant agro-industrial systems and global economies of 
scale mass-produce the resources that modern humans simply acquire 
through, often anonymous, exchange transactions in order to satisfy their 
survival and welfare needs.  By the second half of the twenty-first century, 
the Anthropocene is expected to fundamentally disrupt complex human 
networks of resource extraction, labor division, and market exchange.4  
Energy will become scarce,5 climate change will make weather and water 
hostile,6 and large-scale digital and industrial technologies will outgrow 
 
2. See infra note 44 and accompanying text. 
3. Even though all “humans depend on a non-negotiable biophysical substrate for their 
existence.”  Benjamin Cooke et al., Dwelling in the Biosphere: Exploring an Embodied Human-
Environment Connection in Resilience Thinking, 11 SUSTAINABLE SCI. 831, 832 (2016); see 
also PAUL HAWKEN ET AL., NATURAL CAPITALISM: THE NEXT INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 149 
(Earthscan 10th ed. 2010) (“[I]t is ultimately the capacity of the photosynthetic world and its 
nutrient flows that determine the quality and the quantity of life on earth.”). 
4. For a detailed discussion, see infra Sections I.B–C.  Cf. James Ming Chen, 
Anthropocene Agricultural Law, 3 TEX. A&M L. REV. 745, 770 (2016) (“The prosperity that 
marks humanity’s rise during the Anthropocene masks an abiding menace of extinction.”); 
Joshua Farley, Law for the Anthropocene, 64 BIOSCIENCE 1188, 1188 (2014) (reviewing 
SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL RESILIENCE AND LAW (Ahjond S. Garmenstani & Craig R. Allen eds., 
Columbia Univ. Press 2014)) (“The challenge of the Anthropocene is to build social-ecological 
systems resilient to profound anthropogenic changes, therefore avoiding the collapse of 
civilization.”); Will Steffen et al., The Anthropocene: Are Humans Now Overwhelming the 
Great Forces of Nature?, 36 AMBIO 614, 619 (2007) (“Collapse of modern, globalized society 
under uncontrollable environmental change is one possible outcome.”). 
5. See Louis J. Kotzé, Human Rights and the Environment in the Anthropocene, 1 
ANTHROPOCENE REV. 252, 269 (2014) (“Scientific predictions . . . are more or less in 
agreement that anthropogenic ecological disasters will increase in frequency and severity, and 
it is therefore likely that the intra- and intergenerational divide between rich and poor people 
will only deepen as ecological disasters and food and energy scarcity in the Anthropocene 
intensify.”).  See generally Shane Mulligan, Energy, Environment, and Security: Critical Links 
in a Post-Peak World, GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. Nov. 2010, at 79 (discussing energy scarcity and 
its impacts globally). 
6. See, e.g., Kristina A. Dahl et al., Effective Inundation of Continental United States 
Communities with 21st Century Sea Level Rise, ELEMENTA (July 12, 2017), 
https://www.elementascience.org/articles/10.1525/elementa.234/ (discussing how tidally-
driven coastal flooding caused by sea-level rise has the potential to “alter[] the landscape and 
livability of coastal communities decades before sea level rise causes coastal land to be 
permanently inundated,” and identifying U.S. communities that “will face effective 
inundation . . . within the next 30 years”); Carbon Choices, supra note 1 (modelling the effect 
of anthropogenic carbon emissions on long-term sea-level rise and computing the current U.S. 
“population living on [inundation-]endangered land at municipal, state, and national levels).  
For a discussion of the domino effects of large-scale human migration of hundreds of millions 
of people from heavily-populated coastal communities to landlocked communities forced by 
sea-level rise, see generally Charles Geisler & Ben Currens, Impediments to Inland Resettlement 
Under Conditions of Accelerated Sea Level Rise, 66 LAND USE POL’Y 322 (2017); Mathew E. 
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their supportability.7  All human systems for “wealth” generation and 
attendant “progress”8 created since the Second Industrial Revolution will 
become disrupted, unstable, and often non-resilient, and will encounter 
drastic corrections in overall sustainability and scale.9  Humans will 
 
Hauer, Migration Induced by Sea Level Rise Could Reshape the U.S. Population Landscape, 7 
NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 321 (2017).  For a concrete case study that models the imminent 
and increasing risks and the domino effects of tidal and storm-surge flooding in Miami-Dade 
County, Florida, see Steven A. McAlpine & Jeremy R. Porter, Estimating Recent Local Impacts 
of Sea-Level Rise on Current Real-Estate Losses: A Housing Market Case Study in Miami-
Dade, Florida, 37 POPULATION RES. & POL’Y REV. 871, 871 (2018) (“[T]he accrued current 
cost, in terms of real-estate dollars lost, due to recurrent tidal flooding and projected increases 
of flooding in Miami-Dade County. . . . total[ed] over $465 million in lost real-estate market 
value between 2005 and 2016 [alone].”); see also Jesse M. Keenan et al., Climate 
Gentrification: From Theory to Empiricism in Miami-Dade County, Florida, ENVTL. RES. 
LETTERS (Apr. 23, 2018), https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/aabb32/meta 
(assessing “climate gentrification” in Miami-Dade County, that is, how climate change impacts 
affect the marketability and valuation of property with differing degrees of elevation, 
environmental exposure and resilience functionality). 
7. See Michael R. Gillings & Elizabeth L. Hagan-Lawson, The Cost of Living in the 
Anthropocene, EARTH PERSP., 2014, art. 2, at 1, https://earth-perspectives.springeropen.com/
articles/10.1186/2194-6434-1-2 (“Modern societies are highly dependent on the physical and 
electronic links between larger and larger regions, and especially upon the transport of matter 
and energy.”); Andreas Malm & Alf Hornborg, The Geology of Mankind? A Critique of the 
Anthropocene Narrative, 1 ANTHROPOCENE REV. 62, 64 (2014) (“The affluence of high-tech 
modernity cannot possibly be universalized—become an asset of the species—because it is 
predicated on a global division of labour that is geared precisely to abysmal price and wage 
differences between populations.”); see also Vincent Blok, Earthing Technology: Towards an 
Eco-Centric Concept of Biomimetic Technologies in the Anthropocene, 21 TECHNÉ 127, 130 
(2017) (“[I]t is becoming increasingly clear . . . that humanity is using more natural resources 
than Earth can provide, and that we need two or more planets to support our modern way of 
living in the future . . . .”). 
It should be noted that “scarcity,” “hostility,” and “insupportability” are human constructs 
(or artifacts).  Whether humans and, more to the point, our long-term ecosystem and biosphere 
can or cannot adapt to those evolving conditions of the Earth’s future (as experienced and 
construed as external “limitations” or “restrictions” only by humans) is of concern to only 
humans and their utility-driven abstractions.  Cf. SHELDON SOLOMON ET AL., THE WORM AT 
THE CORE: ON THE ROLE OF DEATH IN LIFE 66 (2015) (“[Modern humans’] capacity to 
strategize, to make decisions, to design and to plan based on an imagined future represented by 
words and symbols, is something no other creature on earth was then, or is now, able to do.”). 
8. For foundational criticism of the human artifacts of “wealth” (or “welfare”) and 
“progress,” see infra note 24 and accompanying text.  For criticism of the “Eurocentric and 
techno-determinist vistas” of the Anthropocene, see Jeremy Baskin, Paradigm Dressed as 
Epoch: The Ideology of the Anthropocene, 24 ENVTL. VALUES 9 (2015); see also Jason W. 
Moore, The Capitalocene, Part I: On the Nature and Origins of Our Ecological Crisis, 44 J. 
PEASANT STUD. 594, 596 (2017); Jason W. Moore, The Capitalocene Part II: Accumulation by 
Appropriation and the Centrality of Unpaid Work/Energy, 45 J. PEASANT STUD. 237 (2018). 
9. Cf. Steffen et al., supra note 4, at 620 (“Enormous, immediate challenges confront 
humanity over the next few decades as it attempts to pass through a bottleneck of continued 
population growth, excessive resource use and environmental deterioration.”); see also Andrew 
J. Hoffman & P. Devereaux Jennings, Institutional Theory and the Natural Environment: 
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relinquish their roles as primary sociospheric change agents, and the 
accelerating scarcity and redistribution of biospheric resources, caused by 
a multiplicity of disequilibria in the Earth system, will become the 
principal driver of social transformation and regression.10 
By either choice or force, humanity will have to adapt and change11—
both rapidly and radically.12  Yet, it appears highly unlikely that change—
and sufficient collective change agency in the first place—can be 
adequately built and established from the bottom up.  Market and 
consumerist forces are too small, slow, narcissistically self-absorbed, 
denialist, and private-actor-centric to efficiently address the magnitude 
and acceleration of Anthropocenic problems faced.13  Similarly, systemic 
course reversion will likely resist institution from the top down.  
Regulatory and governmental forces—and the processes of their 
corralling—are too large, rigid, uncompromisingly partisan, populist, and 
 
Research in (and on) the Anthropocene, 28 ORG. & ENV’T 8, 17 (2015) (“[T]he majority of the 
world’s inhabitants in Anthropocene Society will lose.”).  “[S]ocietal transformation around the 
Anthropocene Era will include, by definition, disruptive forces and voices that challenge core 
institutions of the market society.”  Id. at 19. 
10. Cf. Rory Rowan, Notes on Politics After the Anthropocene, in After the Anthropocene: 
Politics and Geographic Inquiry for a New Epoch, 38 PROGRESS HUM. GEOGRAPHY 439, 447 
(2014) (“[T]he Anthropocene creates opportunities to cast the planet itself [as] a key player in 
the drama of human politics rather than simply its stage.”).  See generally Philip E. Slater, On 
Social Regression, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 339 (1963). 
11. See, e.g., Athena D. Mutua, Framing Elite Consensus, Ideology and Theory & a 
Classcrits Response, 44 SW. L. REV. 635, 650 (2015) (describing that, as a result of climate 
change, the United States and “world will adapt to the forthcoming changes either reactively or 
proactively”). 
12. Cf. Carl Folke et al., Social-Ecological Resilience and Biosphere-Based Sustainability 
Science, 21 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y, no. 3, art. 41, 2016, at 9 (“The Anthropocene calls for rapid 
transformations toward global sustainability.”); Hoffman & Jennings, supra note 9, at 12 (“A 
response to the Anthropocene Era calls for a new and as yet undefined social order called 
‘Anthropocene Society,’ which would transform many preexisting beliefs within multiple 
segments of society.”). 
13. When, among others, twenty-seven Nobel laureate economists come together as co-
signors to endorse a statement on carbon dividends and to unanimously advocate governmental 
intervention in the marketplace in the form of a Pigouvian carbon tax aimed at “correcting a 
well-known market failure” and, thus, addressing global climate change, see Economists’ 
Statement on Carbon Dividends, WALL ST. J.: OPINION (Jan. 16, 2019, 6:55 PM), made 
available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/economists-statement-on-carbon-dividends-
11547682910 [https://perma.cc/4AJP-ZGB5], it appears abundantly clear that the market’s 
ability to self-regulate anything (via exchange transactions, association, property rights and the 
profit motive) of a more polycentric, multiplex, multimodal and multiscalar, thus, dynamic and 
communal dimension is limited to nonexistent.  Cf. R.H. TAWNEY, THE ACQUISITIVE SOCIETY 
6 (1920) (“Yet all the time the principles upon which industry should be based are simple, 
however difficult it may be to apply them; and if they are overlooked it is not because they are 
difficult, but because they are elementary.  They are simple because industry is simple.”). 
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public-system-centric to bring about the tailored efficiency of resilience 
solutions needed.14  Arguably then, a third-order, hybrid path for 
transformation must rather be built from within—namely, the middle out.  
“Middle-out social engineering,” as conceptualized herein, both fosters 
and requires resilience and adaptability at the meso-level—the community 
level—of sociopolitical and socioeconomic organization and governance.  
Cooperative-community resilience, in turn, both fosters and requires 
“smart communities,” namely, those with semi-closed, self-supporting 
economies; sustainable, self-defensible forms of governance and 
government; inclusive, self-referential social norms and social routines; 
and well-grounded, well-scaled legal supports and regulatory practices. 
The present, at best, is at the early-ideation stage for socioeconomic 
and sociolegal transformation in the accelerating Anthropocene.15  
Accordingly, this Foreword aims first to conceptualize the larger and, to 
date, mostly muted conversation of how more self-reliant, shock-resistant, 
and sustainable community may be built efficiently at the advent of 
“Anthropocenic disruption.”16  Second, this Foreword posits that the 
conversation on middle-out social engineering should be situated more 
broadly in the context of law and its social function and, thus, more than 
just reflexively, also in the context of the (legal) education of future-
generation social engineers and “resilience producers.”  The Foreword, 
therefore, also attempts a brief cross-cutting inquiry into the precepts of 
genuine cooperative-community innovation and intrapreneurship in the 
context of “resilience production” and “law learning.”17 
 
14. Cf. Folke et al., supra note 12 (“[I]mproved biosphere stewardship in the 
Anthropocene is not a top-down global approach enforced on people, nor solely a bottom-up 
approach.  It is a process engaging people to collaborate across levels and scales . . . .”). 
15. See Gisli Palsson et al., Reconceptualizing the ‘Anthropos’ in the Anthropocene: 
Integrating the Social Sciences and Humanities in Global Environmental Change Research, 28 
ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y 3, 8 (2013) (“It is now time for us to articulate the culture of emerging 
Anthropocene societies by drawing upon natural scientists, humanities scholars, and social 
scientists, emphasizing the new fusion of the natural and the ideational.”). 
16. “Anthropocenic disruption,” as a term of art coined herein, is discussed, infra Sections 
I.B–C. 
17. Law learning is commonly known as “legal education.”  To “educate,” from Latin 
educare, derivative of educere, means to “bring out,” therefore, to “cultivate or train.”  WALTER 
W. SKEAT, AN ETYMOLOGICAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 185 (Oxford 1882).  
Accordingly, a (societal) purpose larger than the living being (not necessarily human) to be 
trained and cultivated controls education.  Utility applies—and where there is utility, there is 
bargain, exchange, commoditization and value exploitation.  Hierarchy also applies—and where 
there is hierarchy, there is control, subordination, institutionalization and value-exploitation 
coordination.  In contrast, to “learn” derives from Moseo-Gothic lis-nan where the base lis 
probably meant to “find out” and the ending nan meant to “become,” thus, in combination, to 
“become knowledgeable” and, literally, to “find one’s way.”  From the same base lis also comes 
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I. ANTHROPOCENIC DISRUPTION 
“At this stage . . . we are still largely treading on terra incognita.”18 
–Paul J. Crutzen 
Twenty-first-century humans are reaching planetary boundaries to 
sustain life.19  Simultaneously, they are reaching their cooperative and 
organizational boundaries to absorb both the social costs and the 
“ecosystem costs”20 of modern civilization and economies of scale.  The 
core of this problem lies in an orthodox form of human delusionality 
(which is traceable to enlightenment thought aimed,21 in its final though 
 
the Moseo-Gothic laisjan, to “make to know,” thus, to “teach.”  Id. at 326.  Learning and 
teaching are therefore an inseparably joint activity.  A learner can only become knowledgeable 
by making himself to know.  A teacher can only help the learner to become knowledgeable by 
finding her own way first.  Simultaneously, learner and teacher each learn and teach—both, 
individually and symbiotically with each other.  Accordingly, “law learning” is substituted 
herein as the preferred term to describe law school’s core function and activity. 
18. Paul J. Crutzen, Geology of Mankind, 415 NATURE 23, 23 (2002); see also Steffen et 
al., supra note 4, at 614 (“Human activities have become so pervasive and profound that they 
rival the great forces of Nature and are pushing the Earth into planetary terra incognita.”). 
19. That is, all life on Earth, not just human life and, accordingly, not merely carrying 
capacity for the human species.  See, e.g., HAWKEN, supra note 3, at 3 (“Humankind has 
inherited a 3.8-billion-year store of natural capital.  At present rates of use and degradation, 
there will be little left by the end of the [twenty-first] century.”); Steffen et al., supra note 4, at 
614 (“The Great Acceleration,” i.e., the sudden acceleration of the modern human enterprise 
after the end of the Second World War, “is reaching criticality,” and noting that “[w]hatever 
unfolds, the next few decades will surely be a tipping point in the evolution of the 
Anthropocene”); Paul J. Crutzen & Eugene F. Stoermer, The “Anthropocene”, GLOBAL 
CHANGE NEWSL. (The Int’l Geosphere-Biosphere Programme), May 2000, at 17 (“In a few 
generations mankind is exhausting the fossil fuels that were generated over several hundred 
million years.”); see also Kenneth E. Boulding, The Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth, 
in 3 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY IN A GROWING ECONOMY: ESSAYS FROM THE SIXTH RFF 
FORUM 3, 3–5 (Henry Jarrett ed., RFF Press 2011) (1966) (discussing the transition of the 
Earth’s carrying capacity from an open system to a closed system); Douglas A. Kysar, 
Sustainability, Distribution, and the Macroeconomic Analysis of Law, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1, 27 
(2001). 
Ecological economists . . . believe that humanity has now moved to the ‘spaceman 
economy’ . . . in which human productive capacity has outstripped the carrying 
capacity of the earth; that is, the binding constraint on material throughput is no 
longer our capacity to produce, but the earth’s capacity to generate resource inputs 
and absorb waste outputs. 
Id.  “Economists in particular . . . have failed to come to grips with the ultimate consequences 
of the transition from the open to the closed earth.”  Boulding, supra. 
20. Or “natural costs,” namely, the externalities of human productivity and consumption 
imposed on Earth’s natural capital. 
21. Cf. THEODOR W. ADORNO, Culture Industry Reconsidered, in THE CULTURE 
INDUSTRY: SELECTED ESSAYS ON MASS CULTURE 106 (J.M. Bernstein ed., 1991) (“The total 
effect of the culture industry is one of anti-enlightenment, in which . . . enlightenment, that is 
the progressive technical domination of nature, becomes mass deception and is turned into a 
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futile consequence, at transcending, through reason, the closedness of the 
human biological system known as mortality): contrary to indoctrinated 
belief, human (economic) welfare production in modern “acquisitive 
societies”22 is never the production of genuine welfare23 in an 
ecosystemic, planet-Earth-wholistic sense.  Rather, it is the frivolous 
consumption, and therefore the irreversible destruction, of finite high-
grade and low-entropy energy and material resources extracted, and then 
irreplaceably lost, from the Earth’s one-and-only biosphere.24 
 
means for fettering consciousness.”); TAWNEY, supra note 13, at 18–19 (“The magnificent 
formulæ in which a society of farmers and master craftsmen enshrined its philosophy of 
freedom . . . [have become] fetters used by an Anglo-Saxon business aristocracy to bind 
insurgent movements on the part of an immigrant and semi-servile proletariat.”); see also Anna 
Grear, Deconstructing Anthropos: A Critical Legal Reflection on ‘Anthropocentric’ Law and 
Anthropocene ‘Humanity’, 26 L. & CRITIQUE 225, 234 (2015) (“Western rational agency—
including that of law—relies upon a profound separation between rationality and nature and a 
universalising body transcendence.”). 
22. TAWNEY, supra note 13, at 29. 
But to say that the end of social institutions is happiness, is to say that they have 
no common end at all.  For happiness is individual, and to make happiness the 
object of society is to resolve society itself into the ambitions of numberless 
individuals, each directed towards the attainment of some personal purpose. 
Such societies may be called Acquisitive Societies, because their whole 
tendency and interest and preoccupation is to promote the acquisition of wealth. 
Id. 
23. “Welfare” is merely another artifact based on human utility judgments.  See supra 
note 7. 
24. See René Reich-Graefe, Deconstructing Corporate Governance: Director Primacy 
Without Principle?, 16 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 465, 498–99 (2011); see also NICHOLAS 
GEORGESCU-ROEGEN, THE ENTROPY LAW AND THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM, reprinted in 
VALUING THE EARTH: ECONOMICS, ECOLOGY, ETHICS 75, 85 (Herman E. Daly & Kenneth N. 
Townsend eds., 1993). 
Every time we produce a Cadillac, we irrevocably destroy an amount of low 
entropy that could otherwise be used for producing a plow or a spade.  In other 
words, every time we produce a Cadillac, we do it at the cost of decreasing the 
number of human lives in the future.  Economic development through industrial 
abundance may be a blessing for us now and for those who will be able to enjoy it 
in the near future, but it is definitely against the interest of the human species as a 
whole, if its interest is to have a lifespan as long as is compatible with its dowry of 
low entropy. 
Id.; William Rees, in E.F. SCHUMACHER, SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL: ECONOMICS AS IF PEOPLE 
MATTERED 7 (Hartley & Marks 1999) (1973) [hereinafter SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL]. 
All our toys and tools, factories, and infrastructure (our exosomatic organs) require 
continuous flows of energy and material from and to nature for their production, 
maintenance, and operation.  Economists talk about increasing output, of 
maximizing resources or labor productivity, but the reality is that no matter how 
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A. The Anthropocene as Paradigm Change 
As, to date, an unofficial geological time unit in the Earth’s history, 
following either the present interglacial25 Holocene Epoch or the 
Meghalayan Age (i.e., the most recent formal subdivision of 
the Holocene Epoch),26 the Anthropocene, however defined27 or 
 
25. For a general discussion of interglacials in the Quaternary Period (i.e., the current 
geological period), see Jan Zalasiewicz et al., Are We Now Living in the Anthropocene?, GSA 
TODAY, Feb. 2008, at 4, 4–5 [hereinafter Living in the Anthropocene?]. 
26. The International Commission on Stratigraphy (ICS), a constituent scientific body in 
the International Union of Geological Sciences (IUGS), currently operates an Anthropocene 
Working Group (AWG) through the ICS’s Subcommission on Quaternary Stratigraphy (SQS).  
The AWG’s “remit . . . is to examine the status, hierarchical level and definition of the 
Anthropocene as a potential new formal division of the Geological Time Scale.”  Newsletter 1 
(Anthropocene Working Group of the Subcommission on Quaternary Stratigraphy/Int’l 
Comm’n on Stratigraphy), Dec. 2009, at 1, http://quaternary.stratigraphy.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/08/Anthropocene-Working-Group-Newsletter-No1-2009.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/64ZW-P9TA].  In recent years, the AWG has considered various 
recommendations and proposals to officially recognize and define the Anthropocene as a formal 
geological unit—either: (i) at the hierarchical level of a geological epoch as the current 
Holocene Epoch (with the result that, if the Anthropocene were to be recognized at such level, 
the Holocene would have terminated); (ii) at the lower hierarchical level of a geological age (in 
which case the Anthropocene would be a new, fourth subdivision of the Holocene Epoch and 
the current, most recent subdivision, the Meghalayan Age, would have terminated accordingly); 
or (iii) at the higher hierarchical level of a geological period (in which case the entire Quaternary 
Period would have ended).  To date, none of the AWG’s proposals have reached the stage of 
formal ratification by either the SQS/ICS or the IUGS.  Id. at 4; Anthropocene Working Group, 
Working Group on the ‘Anthropocene’, SUBCOMMISSION ON QUATERNARY STRATIGRAPHY, 
http://quaternary.stratigraphy.org/working-groups/anthropocene/ [https://perma.cc/864Z-
RSJN]; see also Living in the Anthropocene?, supra note 25, at 7 (“Sufficient evidence has 
emerged of stratigraphically significant change (both elapsed and imminent) for recognition of 
the Anthropocene—currently a vivid yet informal metaphor of global environmental change—
as a new geological epoch to be considered for formalization by international discussion.”); Jan 
Zalasiewicz et al., The Anthropocene: A New Epoch of Geological Time?, 369 PHIL. 
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A 835, 840 (2011) [hereinafter A New Epoch] (“The 
Anthropocene, on current evidence, seems to show global change consistent with the suggestion 
that an epoch-scale boundary has been crossed within the last two centuries.”); Anthropocene 
Working Group, supra. 
27. The AWG has referred to the Anthropocene as “a term widely used since its coining 
by Paul Crutzen and Eugene Stoermer in 2000 to denote the present time interval, in which 
many geologically significant conditions and processes are profoundly altered by human 
activities.”  Anthropocene Working Group, supra note 26.  The AWG has enumerated those 
conditions and processes as follows: 
[A]n order-of-magnitude increase in erosion and sediment transport associated 
with urbanization and agriculture; marked and abrupt anthropogenic perturbations 
of the cycles of elements such as carbon, nitrogen, phosphorus and various metals 
together with new chemical compounds; environmental changes generated by 
these perturbations, including global warming, sea-level rise, ocean acidification 
and spreading oceanic ‘dead zones’; rapid changes in the biosphere both on land 
and in the sea, as a result of habitat loss, predation, explosion of domestic animal 
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recognized,28 is real and is principally caused by the rise of the human 
technosphere,29 particularly, in the wake of the rapid population 
increases30 and hydrocarbon-driven industrial revolutions beginning in 
Europe around 1800 CE.31  The Anthropocene is also a genuine Kuhnian32 
paradigm shift33 away from anything and everything encountered earlier 
 
populations and species invasions; and the proliferation and global dispersion of 
many new ‘minerals’ and ‘rocks’ including concrete, fly ash and plastics, and the 
myriad ‘technofossils’ produced from these and other materials. 
Id.; see also Crutzen & Stoermer, supra note 19, at 17 (“Considering [the] . . . major and still 
growing impacts of human activities on earth and atmosphere, . . . it seems to us more than 
appropriate to emphasize the central role of mankind in geology and ecology by proposing to 
use the term ‘anthropocene’ for the current geological epoch.”); Steffen et al., supra note 4, at 
614.  The causes of Anthropocenic change are the “human-driven alterations of i) the biological 
fabric of the Earth; ii) the stocks and flows of major elements in the planetary machinery such 
as nitrogen, carbon, phosphorus, and silicon; and iii) the energy balance at the Earth’s surface.”  
Id. 
28. According to the AWG, in order “to be accepted as a formal term[,] the 
‘Anthropocene’ needs to be (a) scientifically justified (i.e. the ‘geological signal’ currently 
being produced in strata now forming must be sufficiently large, clear and distinctive) and (b) 
useful as a formal term to the scientific community.”  Anthropocene Working Group, supra 
note 26 (emphasis omitted). 
29. See Carsten Herrmann-Pillath, Economics of the Anthropocene 1–2 (Aug. 23, 2017) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3024511. 
30. See, e.g., Crutzen & Stoermer, supra note 19, at 17 (citations omitted) (“The expansion 
of mankind, both in numbers and per capita exploitation of Earth’s resources has been 
astounding. . . .  During the past 3 centuries human population increased tenfold to 6000 
million . . . .  Urbanisation has even increased tenfold in the past century.”). 
31. See Steffen et al., supra note 4, at 614 (“The Anthropocene began around 1800 with 
the onset of industrialization, the central feature of which was the enormous expansion in the 
use of fossil fuels.”); see also Crutzen, supra note 18. 
The Anthropocene could be said to have started in the latter part of the eighteenth 
century, when analyses of air trapped in polar ice showed the beginning of growing 
global concentrations of carbon dioxide and methane.  This date also happens to 
coincide with James Watt’s design of the steam engine in 1784. 
Id. 
32. See generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 
(1962) (introducing the concept of paradigm shifts to describe scientific progress). 
33. See Hoffman & Jennings, supra note 9, at 12 (“In social science and philosophical 
terms, the Anthropocene Era leads to a transformative cultural shift that is akin to the 
Enlightenment of the 17th and 18th centuries.”); Steffen et al., supra note 4, at 614 (“The 
phenomenon of global change represents a profound shift in the relationship between humans 
and the rest of nature.”); Will Steffen et al., Planetary Boundaries: Guiding Human 
Development on a Changing Planet, 347 SCI. 736, 736 (2015) (“There is an urgent need for a 
new paradigm that integrates the continued development of human societies and the 
maintenance of the Earth system . . . in a resilient and accommodating state.”); see also Liesel 
Carlsson, 21 HUM. ECOLOGY REV., no. 2, 2015, at 167, 171 (reviewing ROBERT DYBALL & 
BARRY NEWELL, UNDERSTANDING HUMAN ECOLOGY: A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO 
SUSTAINABILITY (2014)) (“We are now sitting at a historical juncture where the feedback loop 
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in the world’s history.  Not only is there no human experiential record in 
the history of planet Earth,34 there is no planetary experiential record35 of 
how life systems on Earth will cope with the fact that “humankind ha[s] 
itself become an agent of geological change.”36  And not just an agent, but 
the agent.37  Collective human agency is engaging all contemporary and 
future societies in the largest possible—thus, truly global—yet, 
“unintended experiment . . . on [their] own life support system.”38  Some 
 
coming from increasing damage to ecosystem and human health is forcing a new cultural 
paradigm.”); Rowan, supra note 10. 
The Anthropocene is not a problem for which there can be a solution.  Rather 
it names an emergent set of geo-social conditions that already fundamentally 
structure the horizon of human existence.  It is thus not a new factor that can be 
accommodated within existing conceptual frameworks, . . . but signals a profound 
shift in the human relation to the planet that questions the very foundations of these 
frameworks themselves. 
Id. 
34. Cf. Nicholas A. Robinson, Fundamental Principles of Law for the Anthropocene?, 44 
ENVTL. POL’Y & L. 13, 13 (2014) (“In the Anthropocene, every dimension of life is different 
from times past.”); Zoltán Boldizsár Simon, Why the Anthropocene Has No History: Facing the 
Unprecedented, 4 ANTHROPOCENE REV. 239, 239 (2017) (“[T]he tendency to invoke modern 
historical thinking in trying to make sense of the Anthropocene amounts to an untenable, self-
contradictory, and self-defeating enterprise.”). 
35. See Crutzen, supra note 18, at 23 (“At this stage, however, we are still largely treading 
on terra incognita.”); Steffen et al., supra note 4, at 614; cf. Living in the Anthropocene?, supra 
note 25, at 6. 
The present interval might evolve into the “super-interglacial” envisaged by 
Broecker, with Earth reverting to climates and sea levels last seen in warmer 
phases of the Miocene or Pliocene, most likely achieved via a geologically abrupt 
rearrangement of the ocean-atmosphere system.  Such a warm phase will likely 
last considerably longer than normal Quaternary interglacials.  It is not clear that 
an equilibrium comparable to that of pre-industrial Quaternary time will eventually 
resume. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
36. Katrina Forrester, The Anthropocene Truism, NATION (May 12, 2016), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/the-anthropocene-truism/ [https://perma.cc/ZRC9-ZCX8]. 
37. See, e.g., Herrmann-Pillath, supra note 29 (stating that the rapid growth of human-
made material infrastructure “resulted into a reversal of the relationship between biosphere and 
techno-topes, ending up in the emergence of the ‘technosphere’ as now encompassing the 
biosphere”); Hoffman & Jennings, supra note 9, at 11. 
Rather than fitting environmental considerations into social systems, it is . . . social 
systems [that] are intruding on natural systems to the point that natural planetary 
systems may be seen as partly nested under the social ones . . . .  We now have 
control over the biosphere and therefore, the human systems which depend on it, 
in ways that are monumental. 
Id. 
38. Steffen et al., supra note 4, at 614; see also Mark J. Hudson, Placing Asia in the 
Anthropocene: Histories, Vulnerabilities, Responses, 73 J. ASIAN STUD. 941, 941 (2014) 
(quoting Johan Rockström et al., A Safe Operating Space for Humanity, 461 NATURE 472 
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of the anthropogenic causes of Anthropocenic change during the most-
recent Great-Acceleration stage have been summarized as follows: 
The human enterprise suddenly accelerated after the end of the 
Second World War.  Population doubled in just 50 years, to over 6 
billion by the end of the 20th century, but the global economy 
increased by more than 15-fold.  Petroleum consumption has grown 
by a factor of 3.5 since 1960, and the number of motor vehicles 
increased dramatically from about 40 million at the end of the War to 
nearly 700 million by 1996.  From 1950 to 2000 the percentage of the 
world’s population living in urban areas grew from 30 to 50% and 
continues to grow strongly.  The interconnectedness of cultures is 
increasing rapidly with the explosion in electronic communication, 
international travel and the globalization of economies. 
The pressure on the global environment from this burgeoning 
human enterprise is intensifying sharply.  Over the past 50 years, 
humans have changed the world’s ecosystems more rapidly and 
extensively than in any other comparable period in human history.  
The Earth is in its sixth great extinction event, with rates of species 
loss growing rapidly for both terrestrial and marine ecosystems.  The 
atmospheric concentrations of several important greenhouse gases 
have increased substantially, and the Earth is warming rapidly.  More 
nitrogen is now converted from the atmosphere into reactive forms by 
fertilizer production and fossil fuel combustion than by all of the 
natural processes in terrestrial ecosystems put together.39 
B. The Anthropocene’s Disruption 
“Anthropocenic Disruption,”40 as conceived in this Foreword, has 
both natural-capital and social-capital dimensions.41  In this sense, it is 
 
(2009)) (“[H]uman impact on the environment has resulted in changes that are dangerously 
eroding the basic life support systems for humans and for many other species, exceeding . . . the 
‘safe operating limits for humanity.’”). 
39. Steffen et al., supra note 4, at 617 (internal references omitted).  See generally Erle C. 
Ellis, Anthropogenic Transformation of the Terrestrial Biosphere, 369 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS 
ROYAL SOC’Y A 1010 (2011) (analyzing the transformation of much of the terrestrial biosphere 
as part of Anthropocenic change); Will Steffen et al., The Anthropocene: Conceptual and 
Historical Perspectives, 369 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A 842 (2011) (examining the 
rapidly evolving and accelerating trends in many global environmental indicators of 
Anthropocenic change); Toby Tyrrell, Anthropogenic Modification of the Oceans, 369 PHIL. 
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A 887 (2011) (discussing Anthropocenic change occurring in 
the Earth’s maritime systems). 
40. Similarly, the “Great Disruption” or the “disruption to end all (fossil-fueled 
technological and financial-engineering) disruptions.” 
41. See Steffen et al., supra note 4, at 615. 
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triggered by modern human activity in a dual, interdependent manner.42  
While “human activities are indeed affecting the structure and functioning 
of the Earth System as a whole,”43 it is the Earth System—from which all 
human activities necessarily derive—that has now begun to systemically 
affect the structures and functioning of modern human activity.  But to 
make matters worse (and much more immediately so), the same human 
activities that affect the Earth’s natural capital also negatively affect 
humanity’s own social capital—and at similar global and systemic 
“erosions of scale.” 
 
We use the term global change to mean both the biophysical and the 
socioeconomic changes that are altering the structure and the functioning of the 
Earth System.  Global change includes alterations in a wide range of global-scale 
phenomena: land use and land cover, urbanisation, globalisation, coastal 
ecosystems, atmospheric composition, riverine flow, nitrogen cycle, carbon cycle, 
physical climate, marine food chains, biological diversity, population, economy, 
resource use, energy, transport, communication, and so on.  Interactions and 
linkages between the various changes listed above are also part of global change 
and are just as important as the individual changes themselves.  Many components 
of global change do not occur in linear fashion but rather show strong 
nonlinearities. 
Id. 
42. Cf. Rowan, supra note 10, at 448–49 (“[T]he Anthropocene . . . allows the distinction 
between the social and the natural, the human and the inhuman to be muddied by way of [the] 
mutually-constitutive intrusions [of social relations].”).  But see Yadvinder Malhi, The Concept 
of the Anthropocene, 42 ANN. REV. ENV’T & RESOURCES 77, 83, 97 (2017) (discussing 
“Anthropocene disruption” merely in terms of “disrupting many aspects of planetary 
functions”); Marcello Di Paola & Dale Jamieson, Climate Change and the Challenges to 
Democracy, 72 U. MIAMI L. REV. 369, 419 (2018) (limiting the term “Anthropocene disruption” 
to the natural-capital disruption of the “earth’s fundamental ecological systems, including those 
that govern climate”). 
43. Steffen et al., supra note 4, at 618. 
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In the natural-capital44 dimension, modernity has been financed 
against a largely stable and plentiful Holocene biosphere45 which, to date, 
has put up limited-to-no “resistance” to human resource extraction and 
resource destruction and, instead, has even “patiently” and 
“unwaveringly” afforded “a certain kind of irreplaceable capital asset, 
namely, the tolerance margins which benign nature always provides.”46  
Now, with tolerance margins rapidly depleting, the overall natural capital 
of the Earth’s biophysical system is in fast-track spending mode while, 
simultaneously, ecosystem costs are sky-rocketing.47  Thus, diminishing 
natural capital, coupled with (still) mostly invisibly accelerating natural 
debt, is the first systemic challenge and “tipping domino” to a very 
different future of the future—or “future-future.”48  A spent-down, 
bankrupted planet cannot carry much, if any, life. 
 
44. See generally SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL, supra note 24, 5–8 (discussing natural capital). 
Schumacher defined natural capital both narrowly and amorphously: fossil fuels 
and the tolerance margins of nature and human subsistence.  Today we understand 
natural capital as the sum total of renewable and non-renewable resources, 
including the ecological systems and services that support life.  It is different from 
conventionally defined capital in that natural capital cannot be produced by human 
activity.  What was unimaginable 25 years ago was the speed with which the loss 
of natural capital would affect humankind. 
HAWKEN, supra note 3, at 5.  For critical accounts of assigning standard neoclassical economic 
frameworks and terminology, as in natural “capital,” to ecological systems, see, for example, 
Mark S. Goldberg & Geoffrey Garver, Measurement of Essential Indicators in Ecological 
Economics, in ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS FOR THE ANTHROPOCENE: AN EMERGING PARADIGM 
125, 130–35 (Peter G. Brown & Peter Timmerman eds., 2016) (pointing out the 
“incommensurability” and “absurdity of . . . any . . . monetized valuation of ecosystems or 
species”); see also PETER G. BROWN, ETHICS FOR ECONOMICS IN THE ANTHROPOCENE 18 
(Kathleen Duffy et al., eds., 2012). 
We cannot rise to the challenge set out by ecological economics by simply 
extending vocabulary from the worldview we are trying to overturn, as for instance 
in the concepts of natural capital and ecosystem services.  A rethink is required of 
the language, structures, practices, and guiding principles that inform our current 
system. 
Id. 
45. See Hudson, supra note 38, at 942. 
46. SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL, supra note 24, at 8. 
47. Cf. Crispin Tickell, Societal Responses to the Anthropocene, 369 PHIL. 
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A 926, 927 (2011). 
48. The “future-future” is the span of future time that only commences beyond the average 
(or individually-prognosticated) life expectancy of the person who thinks, forms expectations, 
and makes predictions about the future.  Unlike the future, which the thinker expects to 
experience personally, the future-future is technically beyond the realm of expectations given 
that the thinker does not have to orient current decision-making for personal survival and 
prosperity vis-à-vis uncertain future outcomes that clearly go beyond her expected length of 
existence.  Accordingly, thinking about the future-future can only be an intellectual exercise.  
Such exercise, however, is severely limited by a special form of bounded rationality, namely, 
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In the dimension of social capital, representing “the informal 
cooperative infrastructure of our societies,”49 we have financed modernity 
against social mores, norms, customs, traditions and institutions that were 
built and transferred by human forebears from generation to generation 
“on the order of centuries or millennia.”50  Now, this massive store of 
accumulated and inherited social capital—constituting the very 
“bracings” that embed51 human cooperation in modern societies which, as 
public-good “privileges,” have been produced, maintained, and 
replenished, often at highest cost,52 by generation after generation of 
human ancestors for the free, “taken as given,”53 “plundering”54 
consumption by today’s modern hominid population—this store is also 
starting to run empty.  The enlightenment’s assault on the collective—
raising the individual and her rights and entitlements above everyone and 
everything else—is almost complete55 due to, in large part, the mass-
 
humans’ limited ability to appreciate system complexity and system interdependency in 
thinking about the future from a vantage point outside of the predictive system (similar to the 
limitations of visualizing and conceptualizing the Milky Way galaxy from its outside rather than 
from the midst of it while necessarily located on planet Earth or, at least, within the Earth’s solar 
system).  Cf. Hoffman & Jennings, supra note 9, at 12 (“[U]nlike in the Enlightenment, which 
celebrated the use of personal observation to make sense of the world, a person cannot really 
learn about the Anthropocene through such direct experience.”). 
49. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity, 
14 J. ECON. PERSP. 159, 167 (2000); see also Morten Hansen & Kate Roll, Social Capital and 
Adoption of Agronomic Practices 6 (Univ. of Oxford, Saïd Bus. Sch., Mutuality in Bus. 
Working Paper No. 2, 2016) (defining social capital as “productive social bonds and community 
norms”).  It should be noted that, as used in this Foreword, the meaning and function of social 
capital is not limited to improving economic outcomes but, as all capital used in human 
cooperation (financial, social, natural, cultural, reputational, “human,” etc.), to improving all 
aspects of socioeconomic and overall social welfare in terms of both personal and collective 
outcomes, including their respective accumulations, costs and distributions. 
50. Oliver E. Williamson, The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking 
Ahead, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 595, 596 (2000).  “Be that as it may, the resulting institutions 
[on the social embeddedness level] have a lasting grip on the way a society conducts itself.”  Id. 
at 597; see also Gerd Gigerenzer & Ulrich Hoffrage, How to Improve Bayesian Reasoning 
Without Instruction: Frequency Formats, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 684, 686 (1995) (“[P]robabilities 
and percentages took millennia of literacy and numeracy to evolve; organisms did not acquire 
information in terms of probabilities and percentages until very recently.”). 
51. See Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of 
Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. SOC. 481, 481–83 (1985). 
52. Including two world wars. 
53. Williamson, supra note 50, at 596. 
54. See Crutzen & Stoermer, supra note 19, at 18. 
55. Cf. Hoffman & Jennings, supra note 9, at 21 (“Ironically, it was the Enlightenment 
that, following the work of Adam Smith, created the concept of the market.  This concept and 
structure has served as the fundamental organizing principle of the neoliberal market for goods 
and services that encroaches on planetary boundaries today.”). 
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consumptive and mass-communicative allure of modern (social) media 
and technology, and virtually constant technology-modulated human 
pseudo-interaction.  Similar to a former open-system planet, a former 
open-system societal fabric, now characterized by progressive, 
irreversible social-capital deterioration and erosion, cannot continue to 
constantly feed on itself and still support human cooperative activity 
indefinitely. 
Thus, while it is certainly the case that “[t]he biological and chemical 
signals left by humans—invisible, intangible in our day-to-day lives—
may leave a [problem] more profound than the physical structures of the 
world’s megacities,”56 the more immediate problem—and second 
systemic challenge and “tipping domino” to the world as we know it—is 
evaporating social capital coupled with stealthily accelerating social debt.  
Social-capital erosion would seem an equally essential inquiry as to the 
very attainability of a future-future for the human race in an Anthropocene 
era.  Surprisingly, however, it constitutes a gravely neglected inquiry57 for 
purposes of explaining, evaluating, and predicting Anthropocenic change.  
When hundreds of millions of (additional) people worldwide are, inter 
alia, malnourished, without access to potable water, and displaced from 
 
56. A New Epoch, supra note 26, at 837. 
57. See, e.g., Frans Berkhout, Anthropocene Futures, 1 ANTHROPOCENE REV. 154, 154 
(2014) (“[T]here is a need for a greater focus on Anthropocene Futures that are relevant to 
societal actors now and in the relatively near-term future.”); Hoffman & Jennings, supra note 
9, at 17 (“[I]t is evident that both constructs—Anthropocene Era and Anthropocene Society—
are fundamentally under-developed.”); Palsson et al., supra note 15, at 7 (“[I]t is remarkable 
how little . . . concepts [like the Great Acceleration] tell us about the process, the driving forces, 
and the social consequences of the changes they imply.”).  “[T]he social and political change 
that is needed for [Anthropocenic] sustainability is poorly understood.”  Id. at 9.  To provide a 
concrete example in this regard: so-called “tipping elements” have been introduced in climate-
change research and 
described as abrupt or irreversible changes in the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) Fifth Assessment Report[; they constitute] . . . elements 
(i.e., subsystems) within the earth’s climate system that could pass critical 
thresholds, resulting in the destabilization, destruction, critical damage, or 
transmutation of the major subsystems of the climate system. 
Yoshihiko Iseri et al., Towards the Incorporation of Tipping Elements in Global Climate Risk 
Management: Probability and Potential Impacts of Passing a Threshold, 13 SUSTAINABILITY 
SCI. 315, 315 (2018) (citations omitted).  No such tipping elements (or similar concepts) appear 
to be systematically investigated, modelled, or otherwise discussed in the social-capital 
deterioration realm of the Anthropocene.  Cf. Gillings & Hagan-Lawson, supra note 7, at 8 
(“The planetary boundaries central to the Anthropocene concept imply social tipping points that 
accompany the planetary tipping points . . . .”); Herrmann-Pillath, supra note 29, at 2 (“What is 
needed is a science of the technosphere, part and parcel of the sciences of the Anthropocene.  
This cannot be only based on the sciences and engineering disciplines, but requires close cross-
disciplinary integration, especially with the social sciences.”). 
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their former habitats of (relative and numbing) comfort by the forces of 
nature,58 no social norms, mores, customs, traditions, or institutions will 
have any bearing or constraint on their single-minded quest for survival 
and, at least, some temporary modicum of residual creature comforts 
(nutrition, shelter, other basic protections from “the elements,” etc.).59  
Whatever social capital may then have survived, it will quickly turn brittle 
under these circumstances and conditions and yield to an Anthropocenic 
bellum omnium contra omnes. 
C. Anthropocenic Vulnerability & “Early Twenty-First-Century 
Ostrich Syndrome” 
“In the face of th[e] relentless loss of living systems [and natural 
capital], fractious political conflicts over laws, regulations, and business 
economics [may] appear petty and small”60—but only when opportunely 
discounting Anthropocenic social-capital loss and assuming sociopolitical 
functionality levels still available in today’s modern civilizations.  Once 
those fractious conflicts reach post-political dimensions—that is, when 
they can no longer be (sufficiently) dealt with by re-incrementally 
achieving large-scale compromise of disparate and ultra-competitive 
factional interests through representation-legitimatized political systems 
of public governance—they are guaranteed to no longer appear petty and 
 
58. See Eric Biber, Law in the Anthropocene Epoch, 106 GEO. L.J. 1, 20 (2017). 
Displacement of tens or hundreds of millions of people as a result of climate 
change . . . will deprive those people of access to food, clean water, security, and 
health services.  That deprivation, in turn, will increase the risk of disease and food 
insecurity, creating a vicious cycle that will further increase the human harms from 
climate change. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
Do we think that the risk of political and legal disruption will be lower or higher if 
we wait until millions of climate refugees are fleeing sea level rise, if droughts and 
changes to precipitation and water storage systems are causing dramatic impacts 
on agricultural systems, and if our economic and physical infrastructure is under 
severe stress? 
Id. at 67. 
59. In the U.S., for example, many of these people will also be heavily armed.  See, e.g., 
AARON KARP, SMALL ARMS SURVEY, ESTIMATING GLOBAL CIVILIAN-HELD FIREARMS 
NUMBERS 4 (2018), http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/T-Briefing-Papers/SAS-
BP-Civilian-Firearms-Numbers.pdf [https://perma.cc/T3TG-XXBJ] (estimating a rate of 
civilian-held legal and illicit firearms in the U.S. in 2017 of 120.5 firearms per 100 residents—
the highest per-capita rate in the world—followed by Yemen with the second-highest estimated 
rate of only 52.8 firearms per 100 residents). 
60. HAWKEN, supra note 3. 
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small.61  There will be nothing but post-political, even “post-societal” 
conflict; natural-capital preservation will be completely irrelevant to then-
remaining human activity; and après moi, le déluge will remain the only 
common-denominator, survivalist behavioral mindset. 
Unfortunately, this is no longer a distant dystopian scenario.  Current 
generations of (law) students, during their own lifetimes, will encounter 
systemic, massive-scale and unprecedented disruption to the 
sociopolitical, socioeconomic, and sociolegal equilibrium that, on 
average, first-world humans still enjoy and take for granted today.62  The 
Anthropocenic catastrophe will be real.  It is already nascent today.  And 
it is unavoidable under all circumstances—that is, it will occur 
irrespective of all human mitigation activity in both the present and the 
future.  And, finally, it will disrupt the social-capital ordering of human 
societies way before the Anthropocene’s natural-capital disruption will 
reach full swing.  Anthropocenic disruption has long started and certain 
“tipping elements”63 have already been established in this regard—they 
are the present, not a future reality, even if their full effect will only 
materialize later in the twenty-first and twenty-second centuries.  
Anthropogenic sea-level rise serves as an already well-researched 
example in this regard—an example that is “here,” in both time and space, 
and that under no circumstances will ever “go away,” or may simply be 
ignored. 
When people think of Cambridge, Massachusetts, many will think of 
Harvard University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).  
Very few will think of climate change and that Cambridge, Massachusetts 
is highly vulnerable to climate-change-induced sea-level rise.  According 
to a study published in the Proceedings of the U.S. National Academy of 
Sciences (PNAS) in 2015,64 the then-already locked-in sea-level rise65—
based entirely on historical, pre-2016 anthropogenic greenhouse-gas 
emissions—meant that land area in Cambridge which was home to at least 
 
61. Cf. Palsson et al., supra note 15, at 8 (“This is a grave underestimation of the problem.  
Our suggestion is that . . . we should draw on the growing work in all fields of science that 
suggests the fundamentally disruptive and discontinuous character of our current phase of 
societal and planetary development.”). 
62. Cf. Hoffman & Jennings, supra note 9, at 12 (“A response to the Anthropocene Era 
calls for a new and as yet undefined social order called ‘Anthropocene Society,’ which would 
transform many preexisting beliefs within multiple segments of society.”). 
63. See Iseri et al., supra note 57, at 315–16. 
64. See Carbon Choices, supra note 1. 
65. The term “locked-in” here means that such long-term sea-level rise has not yet 
happened, but that it is projected to inevitably do so in the future.  See id. at 13509. 
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twenty-five percent of its 2010 census-data population was already 
committed66 in 2015 to fall below the future high-tide line.67  
Unfortunately for Cambridge, this was only the study’s “baseline”-case68 
modelling scenario which made no assumptions as to the collapse of the 
West Antarctic Ice Sheet (WAIS).  Recent climate research is finding 
“evidence that some degree of irreversible loss from the WAIS may have 
begun.”69  Thus, according to the study’s “triggered” case,70 which 
assumes WAIS collapse, resultant long-term sea-level rise will have 
catastrophic effects on coastal communities, including many of the largest 
metropolitan areas worldwide, among them, Boston and its immediate 
neighbor, Cambridge, Massachusetts.  Without the expensive, 
coordination-intensive, and time-consuming construction of massive-
scale sea defenses71 against the Atlantic Ocean, land area in Cambridge 
inhabited by at least half of its 2010-census population was already 
committed in 2015 to become permanently submerged at some point in 
the future, arguably, within the next century, under the WAIS-collapse 
scenario.72 
Permanent inundation, however, is not the only inundation problem 
caused by rising sea levels.  By the time permanent inundation becomes 
reality, affected land will long have ceased to be inhabitable because of 
 
66. Likewise, livable land area is “committed” when it is no longer avoidable for that 
particular land area to not fall below the high tide line—even if adaptive measures to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions were taken post-2015, and even if such adaptive measures would 
reduce post-2015 greenhouse gas emissions completely to zero.  Id. at 13508–09. 
67. Benjamin H. Strauss et al., Carbon Choices Determine US Cities Committed to 
Futures Below Sea Level: Supporting Information, PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI., at 4 tbl.S3, 
https://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/suppl/2015/10/08/1511186112.DCSupplemental/pnas.201
511186SI.pdf?targetid=nameddest%3DST1 [https://perma.cc/FNW5-T5HZ] [hereinafter 
Carbon Choices Supporting Information]; cf. Gillings & Hagan-Lawson, supra note 7, at 8 
(“The time lag between cause and effect for complex earth systems mean[s] that likely effects 
are already mortgaged into the future, and preventing the causes now will not stop the changes 
that are already in train.”). 
68. Carbon Choices, supra note 1. 
69. Peter Good et al., Recent Progress in Understanding Climate Thresholds: Ice Sheets, 
the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation, Tropical Forests and Responses to Ocean 
Acidification, 42 PROGRESS PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 24, 32 (2018); see also Eric Rignot et al., 
Four Decades of Antarctic Ice Sheet Mass Balance From 1979–2017, 116 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. 
SCI. 1095, 1102 (2019) (“In sum, the northern sector of West Antarctica is losing mass rapidly 
and could entrain the progressive collapse of a large share of West Antarctica and its 5.1-[meter 
sea-level equivalent].”). 
70. Carbon Choices, supra note 1. 
71. See, e.g., Jochen Hinkel et al., Coastal Flood Damage and Adaptation Costs Under 
21st Century Sea-Level Rise, 111 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 3292 (2014). 
72. Carbon Choices Supporting Information, supra note 67, at 6 tbl.S5. 
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“effective inundation—defined as having 10% or more of livable land area 
flooded at least 26 times per year” as a result of “tidal flooding—coastal 
flooding that is driven in large part by routine tidal fluctuations rather than 
precipitation or storm surge.”73  At current levels and estimates, growing 
portions of livable land area in Cambridge, Massachusetts are already on 
track to becoming effectively inundated—that is, on average, to 
experiencing bi-weekly tidal flooding—as early as 2060.74  Cambridge is 
also vulnerable to periodic coastal storm-surge flooding when “[l]arge 
storms, such as hurricanes, . . . produce . . . higher than normal amounts 
of water generated and [being] pushed inland.”75  While “Cambridge is 
connected to Boston Harbor and the ocean by the Charles River and the 
Alewife Brook, a tributary to the Mystic River, the Charles River Dam 
and the Amelia Earhart Dam (on the Mystic River) have been able to block 
surges from coming up rivers.”76  Unfortunately, these dams are not 
protecting Cambridge from storm-surge flooding for much longer.  “It is 
projected that the Amelia Earhart Dam will likely be bypassed around 
2045 and the Charles River Dam around 2055.”77  These storm-surge 
flooding, effective flooding, and permanent flooding scenarios are not 
theoretical scenarios of what if—they are future projections of when.  
They pose very practical, very real questions of how much time is left and 
how quickly Cambridge must prepare.  In other words, Harvard and MIT 
should plan now—comprehensively and as a first and foremost 
institutional priority—to either relocate completely to higher ground and 
properly decommission and leave behind all of their respective current 
“permanent” infrastructures, or to find feasible, fail-safe ways to flood-
proof themselves, Cambridge, and the larger Boston area against 
 
73. Dahl et al., supra note 6, at 1 (emphasis added). 
74. Id.  When “[m]apping the extent of effective inundation within the 23 coastal states of 
the continental US at a series of time steps between now and 2100 using tide gauge-specific sea 
level rise projections based on three global sea level rise scenarios published for the Third US 
National Climate Assessment (NCA hereafter),” id. at 3, livable land area in Cambridge, 
Massachusetts will encounter effective inundation (under either NCA’s highest sea-level 
scenario (NCAH) or NCA’s intermediate-high sea-level scenario (NCAI)) by the following 
percentages: 2060 (NCAH)—10.1%; 2070 (NCAH)—35.8%; 2080 (NCAH)—42%; 2080 
(NCAI)—10.2%; 2090 (NCAH)—46.7%; 2100 (NCAH)—50.3%; 2100 (NCAI)—39.3%.  Id. 
at 17 tbl.S3 (providing a supplemental table of the percentage of inundation within communities 
for all years and scenarios). 
75. CITY OF CAMBRIDGE, MASS., CLIMATE CHANGE VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT 
REPORT-PART 2 4 (2017), https://www.cambridgema.gov/CDD/Projects/Climate/~/media/
F93208C3B12D4AACBD3E0F3A712F68C7.ashx [https://perma.cc/EFX8-2L74]. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. at 5. 
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catastrophic storm-surge, then effective, then finally permanent 
inundation. 
Lastly and again, unfortunately, Cambridge is in a lot of “not-so-
good” company.  According to the PNAS study discussed earlier, land 
area inhabited by close to twenty million people in U.S. coastal states 
(based on 2010 U.S. census population data) was already committed in 
2015 to become permanently inundated under the WAIS-collapse 
modelling scenario.78  Similarly, based on the NCA’s intermediate-high 
and highest sea-level rise scenarios,79 “489 and 668 communities [within 
the twenty-three coastal states of the continental United States], 
respectively, would face effective inundation by the year 2100.”80  Left 
unabated, that is, without the relatively swift construction of efficient sea 
defenses along large parts of the U.S. coastlines, people in all of these 
coastal communities will be forcefully displaced.  They will lose their land 
and their homes; their property values will evaporate into thin air; and they 
will have to hunt for new permanent shelter and home.  In addition, and 
probably more vexing in terms of overall “decommission costs” and 
“relocation costs,” all major infrastructure in these coastal communities 
(e.g., all transportation infrastructure, warehouses, factories, industrial 
complexes, power plants, refineries, electrical and telecommunication 
grids, waste management systems, underground storage facilities, etc.) 
will have to be safely and securely built back, demolished, and its sites 
cleaned up.  Furthermore, large-scale and completely unprecedented 
human migration away from oceanic and riparian shorelines to more 
scarce higher ground will have to be organized, and replacement 
settlements and support infrastructure will have to be found,81 often 
requiring new construction or large-scale adaptation of existing 
 
78. Including a minimum of twenty-five percent of inhabited land in large cities like 
Boston, Honolulu, and Long Beach; a minimum of fifty percent in cities like Miami, St. 
Petersburg, and Virginia Beach; and all one hundred percent of residential land in New Orleans 
and Hialeah.  Carbon Choices Supporting Information, supra note 67, at 6–7 tbls.S5 & S6. 
79. See Dahl et al., supra note 6, at 1, 17 tbl.S3. 
80. Id. at 1. 
81. See, e.g., Geisler & Currens, supra note 6, at 322–23 (discussing coastal out-
migrations and barriers to entry in noncoastal hinterlands); Hauer, supra note 6 (modelling the 
potential impacts in landlocked communities created by sea-level rise induced displacement); 
Robinson, supra note 34, at 16–17 (“No government . . . has enough money or personnel to 
restore communities disrupted by climate change events to their condition before the tragedy.  
It will not be possible to ‘rebuild everywhere’ to restore what was.  The seas will reclaim coastal 
sites, and funds will be needed to resettle people inland . . . .”). 
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infrastructure within acute and non-repeat “time scales beyond past 
experience.”82 
Accordingly, the central argument in terms of Anthropocenic 
disruption is that—long before, for example, anthropogenic sea-level rise 
will have fully materialized later in the twenty-first and twenty-second 
centuries—the original onslaught of disruption will systemically 
challenge the tangible and intangible social structures, social institutions, 
social habitats, and the very sociotopes of modern human civilization.83  
And it will do so globally and much sooner than expected, that is, over 
only a few next decades.  In other words, the “tipping dominos” of 
Anthropocenic natural-capital disruption (for example, permanent sea-
water inundation) are not only falling forward in time—that is, they only 
topple over as and when they will actually materialize, thus, affecting only 
their subsequent future and future-future.  They also, first and foremost, 
already fall backward in time—that is, they already topple over and onto 
present societies, thus, way before they will actually materialize in the 
future.  Accordingly, they are already affecting today’s social systems and 
are triggering an unprecedented (and still largely unnoticed) accelerating 
cascade of Anthropocenic social-capital disruption.84  Consequently, the 
 
82. Gillings & Hagan-Lawson, supra note 7, at 7; cf. Palsson et al., supra note 15, at 3 
(“There is growing recognition that humans are faced with a critical and narrowing window of 
opportunity to halt or reverse some of the key indicators involved in the environmental crisis.”). 
83. See Gillings & Hagan-Lawson, supra note 7, at 8 (mentioning, though only in passing, 
potential civilizational collapse); cf. Hoffman & Jennings, supra note 9, at 19 (“[O]ne challenge 
for the study of the Anthropocene Era is that no single event will create a disruption to a new 
institutional order.”). 
84. For example, Anthropocenic disruption is already causing new forms of 
socioeconomic vulnerability in coastal communities today, known as “climate gentrification.”  
See Keenan et al., supra note 6.  In this regard, Anthropocenic disruption has already had a 
measurable effect on real-estate valuations.  See, e.g., McAlpine & Porter, supra note 6.  
Accordingly, there will be two displacement waves in coastal communities: the first in time is 
anticipatory of future sea-level rise and storm-surge, effective and permanent flooding, and it 
is already occurring now (as socioeconomic displacement of lower-income people in higher-
altitude coastal areas).  The second in time will be actual as a result of occurring storm-surge 
and effective flooding in the future (as biophysical displacement of (remaining) people in lower-
altitude coastal areas; note that actual, biophysical displacement will not wait until permanent 
flooding).  Actual displacement already causes direct, primary Anthropocenic vulnerability (for 
example, on higher-income people in lower-altitude coastal areas).  Anticipatory displacement 
already causes collateral, secondary Anthropocenic vulnerability (for example, on lower-
income people in higher-altitude coastal areas).  Thus, as part of climate gentrification, today’s 
people with primary Anthropocenic vulnerability but more socioeconomic “wherewithal” are 
already financing their private Anthropocenic resilience by anticipatorily displacing (thus, 
increasing the secondary Anthropocenic vulnerability of) people with less socioeconomic 
“clout” and “resilience capital.”  Collateral, secondary Anthropocenic vulnerability is often 
systemic for affected populations and, in terms of both its earlier timing and its social-capital 
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more immediate and disruptive character of what may be termed 
“Anthropocenic vulnerability” is its constituent social vulnerability (not 
its more protracted, though significantly larger, ecological-vulnerability 
component)85—namely, an accelerating social-capital susceptibility and 
defenselessness to the coming “hyper-inflation” of sociopolitical stability 
and to the “devaluation” and erosion of social norms, mores, customs, 
traditions, and institutions in the wake of everyday Anthropocenic 
disruptive chaos and system-wide failure.  Whereas the natural-capital 
dimension of Anthropocenic disruption will bring unprecedented natural-
system destabilization and disequilibrium, including (and discussed most 
prominently today) climate-system destabilization, the social-capital 
realm of Anthropocenic disruption will witness a profound social-system 
destabilization and disequilibrium, including (though rarely discussed 
today) an institutional, macro-system destabilization,86 that—as is posited 
and predicted here—will also force humankind to drastically “rightsize” 
socioeconomic cooperation and to radically de-grow and decarbonize 
modern production and consumption systems.  Today’s modern 
socioeconomic systems are aggressively corporatized, financialized, and 
globalized.  They are deemed too big to fail.  In reality, particularly under 
Anthropocenic disruptive conditions, they are wholistically insupportable, 
inevitably prone to systemic failure, and thus, too big to not fail. 
 
disruption, more important to address immediately.  However, it is also harder to notice and, 
therefore, is much more neglected in terms of resilience planning and resilience governance.  
See generally J. Julius Graefe, Climate Justice: An Assessment of Gentrification and the 
Disparate Displacement of Marginalized Groups in U.S. Coastal Communities (2018) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Western New England Law Review) (discussing the 
displacement of residents in American coastal communities through climate gentrification, and 
offering climate justice solutions to protect local residents against climate gentrification and 
displacement). 
85. See generally Angela P. Harris, Vulnerability and Power in the Age of the 
Anthropocene, 6 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY CLIMATE & ENV’T 98, 109–27 (2014) (developing 
a theory of ecological vulnerability premised on Martha Fineman’s vulnerability paradigm). 
86. See Jorge E. Viñuales, Law and the Anthropocene 48 (Cambridge Ctr. for Env’t, 
Energy and Nat. Res. Governance, Working Paper No. 2016-5, 2016) (“[T]he institutional 
changes that will need to be phased-in and those that will be phased-out are of gargantuan 
dimensions.”); cf. Hoffman & Jennings, supra note 9, at 15 (“In a world with increasing periods 
of scarcity and calamity, . . . institutional systems might break down or fragment.”). 
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II. COMMUNITY RESILIENCE 
“The need for long-term planning . . . is hard to overestimate, but 
democratic systems offer few incentives to cultivate expectations of a 
future of scarcity and sacrifice.”87 
–Shane Mulligan 
The only “right size” of human cooperation and cooperative 
organization in the face of Anthropocenic disruption that first-world, 
modern humans still have residual experience with is community.88  A 
“New” or “Second Renaissance,” as a concerted social-capital response to 
Anthropocenic disruption, will necessitate severely-downscaling 
institutional and social-system changes and, as is argued here, a 
corresponding rediscovery of the middle, communal realm in all of its 
organizational and normative dimensions.89  Consequently, putting one’s 
head in the sand in order to wait out one’s remaining lifetime and to 
protect one’s ignorance, or merely deciding to react to, and massage the 
margins of, the Anthropocene’s disruptive impact as and when it 
materializes later in plain, unignorable sight, or otherwise subscribing to 
the neoliberal business-as-usual complacency approach as a coping 
strategy90 due to either rational inertia or even stronger denialist 
proclivities, are all not responsible or even viable options remaining to 
humanity today.91  Our92 world will not become a better place by insisting 
 
87. Mulligan, supra note 5, at 92. 
88. “Community” is used herein in a functional and organizational sense, thus, as the 
meso-realm of human cooperation in-between micro-levels (relational/group) and macro-levels 
(institutional/social).  Therefore, it is not limited to only spatial forms of meso-organization (for 
example, the so-called “local communities” we live in) but includes all forms of cooperative 
community. 
89. Cf. Hoffman & Jennings, supra note 9, at 18 (“How will society resist or transition to 
a new set of social values in Anthropocene Society . . . ?”). 
90. See, e.g., Steffen et al., supra note 4 (“[Among] three broad philosophical 
approaches . . . in the growing debate about dealing with the changing global 
environment[,] . . . . [t]he business-as-usual approach appears, on the surface, to be a safe and 
conservative way forward.”); Christopher Wright et al., Editorial Introduction, Organizing in 
the Anthropocene, 25 ORG. 455, 459–60 (2018) (“[I]n corporate boardrooms, political offices 
and mainstream media there is little if any acknowledgement of the huge ecological 
transformations humanity and other species face due in large part to the ‘business as usual’ 
trajectory.”). 
91. Cf. Shalanda H. Baker, Adaptive Law in the Anthropocene, 90 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
563, 564 (2015) (“[R]eliance on neoliberal economic development institutions and 
methodologies to engage in the climate change adaptation project will render states in the Global 
South even more vulnerable and less resilient in the face of climate change.”). 
92. After diagnosing the Anthropocenic disruptive dilemma for humankind in somewhat 
detached, third-person terms in Part I, the remaining discussion of action in the face of 
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that others do a better job or that we somehow magically put better 
governments and more responsible corporations in place in order to take 
care of things.  Such a purely reflexive and placative approach is exactly 
how we, individually and collectively, make our social-capital world 
worse every day.  We are all dependent on public goods, we are always 
willing to declare our support of the common welfare, but then we 
condition such support, in actual deeds, not merely words, routinely on 
everyone else pulling their respective weight—thus, opportunistically and 
self-deceptively pacifying our conscience by trusting an elusive 
“infallibility of the alchemy by which the pursuit of private ends is 
transmuted into the attainment of public good.”93  As a result of such 
“reciprocity of hesitation” and “mutuality of inaction,” we are all 
freeriding and conveniently rationalizing why we should pull less because 
others are not pulling as hard as we think they should.  Social 
entrenchment, stifling communal innovation and suppressing justice in 
our collective realms, inevitably ensues—with no top-down hierarchy-
centered or bottom-up contracting-based solution available to break this 
persistent, noxious default mode. 
A. The Absence of Resilience in the Absence of Community 
Resilience is both an inversion and a consequence of vulnerability.94  
All systems—whether open or closed, natural or social—are vulnerable at 
all times.95  The Earth system96 is vulnerable, inter alia, to anthropogenic 
natural-resource destruction and resultant climate change.  Humanity is 
vulnerable, inter alia, because it is rapidly losing both the natural and 
social bracings that sustain modern human civilization.  Particularly, 
 
Anthropocenic social-capital deterioration is quintessentially personal.  Accordingly, changing 
similarly to first-person plural forms appears appropriate, if not, necessary. 
93. TAWNEY, supra note 13, at 14–15. 
94. See, e.g., C.S. Holling, Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems, 4 ANN. REV. 
ECOLOGY & SYSTEMATICS 1, 17 (1973). 
Resilience determines the persistence of relationships within a system and is 
a measure of the ability of these systems to absorb changes of state variables, 
driving variables, and parameters, and still persist.  In this definition resilience is 
the property of the system and persistence or probability of extinction is the result. 
Id. 
95. For a detailed discussion of the potential pitfalls of resilience planning, aimed at 
minimizing climate disruption at the community level, and of the vulnerabilities created by such 
resilience planning because of the general neglect of pervasive ecosystem service trade-offs 
analyses, see Keith H. Hirokawa & David Dickinson, The Costs of Climate Disruption in the 
Trade-Offs of Community Resilience, 41 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 455 (2019). 
96. For a definition of “Earth system,” see Steffen et al., supra note 4, at 615. 
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modern human community is largely non-resilient to non-existent.97  
Modern first-world societies are designed and built to separate and isolate 
their human constituents from each other.  In terms of day-to-day activity, 
humans share virtually nothing with others on a genuine communal level.  
The moment reliable access98 (i.e., far from all access) to, inter alia, 
readily-available electricity, gasoline, heating, and cooling sources is 
removed from modern urban, suburban, and exurban lifestyles, the 
illusion of community (if not, of society) quickly collapses, and the 
communal vacuity of all modern mass-communicative, mass-
consumptive, and mass-migratory human activity is fully exposed.  
Modern humans live disconnected, lonely lives in constant transition—
isolated from nature, from (most) family, from neighbors, even from 
themselves.  Their being among (rather than with) others happens99 mostly 
when there is either a commonality of productive purpose (mainly, 
income-generating work), a parallelity of consumptive purpose (for 
example, eating out in restaurants or attending entertainment events), or 
an accidentally-conjoining transition from one to the other of such 
purposes (for example, while generating road traffic or riding on public 
transportation).  Neither purpose creates communality but only 
temporarily and spatially relieves atomistic separation and isolation.  
Either purpose is also premised on economic exchange and, thus, has a 
built-in, bargained-for utility that dictates both the individual activity and, 
worse, the resultant relationship(s) of labor division and commercial 
reciprocity.  Accordingly, resultant relationships of being among others 
(or in the mere presence of others) are inescapably “stunted” by 
consumptive personal-utility maximization and, thus, can never transmute 
into, or otherwise become part of, genuine community.100  On average, 
post-postmodern civilizations evidence the wrong housing patterns, 
transportation systems, food and water supplies, as well as energy 
infrastructures in order to muster sufficient amounts of resilience, 
communal or otherwise, so as to confidently face Anthropocenic 
 
97. See Herrmann-Pillath, supra note 29, at 1 (stating that because of the growth of the 
human network of interactions over time, “independent human communities became extremely 
rare”). 
98. Of course, “access,” in terms of passive receipt of energy as an instant consumption 
good, conceals the absurd amounts of capital investment, labor and regulation necessary for 
purposes of coordinating the complex active endeavors involved in the long-distance 
production, distribution, and delivery of energy. 
99. Often unavoidably, not necessarily intentionally. 
100. For a brief and incomplete approximation of “genuine community,” see infra note 
103 and accompanying text. 
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disruption.101  The moment we (can) no longer participate in the above 
three realms of bargaining activity (for individual utility maximization 
with only collateral benefits to some secondary and subordinated 
collective welfare), the pseudo-community of modern life comes to a 
crushing end and with no real community to replace it.  Real community 
is now rarely practiced, and little-to-no real community structures have 
been arranged (or have survived) in a resilient and sustainable manner.102  
Half a century ago, Philip Slater suggested as “three human desires that 
[were already then] deeply and uniquely frustrated by American culture”: 
(1) The desire for community—the wish to live in trust and fraternal 
cooperation with one’s fellows in a total and visible collective entity. 
(2) The desire for engagement—the wish to come directly to grips with 
social and interpersonal problems and to confront on equal terms an 
environment which is not composed of ego-extensions. 
(3) The desire for dependence—the wish to share responsibility for the 
control of one’s impulses and the direction of one’s life.103 
 
101. For example, according to the March 2018 report by the national transportation 
research group TRIP, “[s]eventy percent of Americans over fifty live where [public] transit does 
not exist or serves the area very poorly.”  TRIP, PRESERVING THE MOBILITY AND SAFETY OF 
OLDER AMERICANS 7 (2018), http://www.tripnet.org/docs/Older_Americans_Mobility_TRIP_
Report_2018.pdf.  A significant “majority of older Americans—79 percent—tend to live in car-
dependent suburban and rural communities, which typically require frequent, longer distance 
trips by automobile.”  Id. at 5.  As a result, for Americans “65 and older, 90 percent of travel 
takes place in a private vehicle, and for Americans 85 and older, 80 percent of travel occurs in 
a private vehicle,” id., while “public transit accounts for just two percent of trips.”  Id. at 7.  
Today, the illusion of private autonomy and self-mobility (i.e., auto-mobility), on average, 
always ends for personal reasons: physical and mental frailty and deteriorating health means 
that “[m]en typically outlive their driving days by seven years and women by ten years.”  Id. at 
6. 
102. For a detailed discussion of the dynamic, multinodal, thus, rich and complex 
reciprocity that undergirds a genuine community infrastructure in the context of community-
supported agriculture and locally-based community economic development, see Sarah Waring, 
Complex Reciprocity in a Local Food System, 41 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 543 (2019). 
103. PHILIP E. SLATER, THE PURSUIT OF LONELINESS: AMERICAN CULTURE AT THE 
BREAKING POINT 5 (Beacon Press 1970).  It should be noted that these three human desires are 
not meant herein as either absolute or the only goals of communal innovation, etc.  Rather, they 
merely (but pervasively) signal, as frustrated desires, the ambivalence that (most) people 
encounter as “individuals in chosen isolation” in their modern societies, as well as the lack of 
agency by those same people to develop principled and co-existent notions of community and 
individuality that could be lived and experienced in synthesis (i.e., not in opposition, thus, not 
in competition) with each other.  As proposed herein, our community ecology has to reach a 
realm of both individuality and community that transcends utility- and exchange-based notions 
of reciprocity/mutuality, and in which their currently prevailing mutual exclusivity (i.e., more 
of one inevitably means less of the other in our modern individuality-community equilibrium) 
no longer applies.  See infra note 153 and accompanying text. 
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B. Community Resilience & Community Intrapreneurship 
Accordingly, how can we, the “common people of the 
Anthropocene,”104 innovate our neglected and contracting “community 
ecology” from the middle-out, foster pervasive socioeconomic innovation 
in anticipation of accelerating Anthropocenic disruption and, thus, 
intermediate the structures, institutions and practices needed for long-
term, small-to-medium-scale “social-engineering resilience,”105 
sustainability, and equity?  We desperately need advanced—that is, more 
radical, more egalitarian, more hybridized, more modular and 
decoupled,106 better researched and understood, better intermediated and 
coordinated, and more widely adopted—structures, institutions and 
practices of mid-level socioeconomic organization and governance.107  
How do we teach individual, and design institutional, present-day and 
next-generation “resilience producers” to develop necessary research and 
practice tools for “synecology innovation”108 and cooperative-community 
resilience? 
One systemic, cross-cutting and common-denominator response in 
this regard is to right-level cooperative-community resilience,109 
therefore, to foster what could be termed “community-level 
intrapreneurship” (or “community intrapreneurship” for short).110  
Intrapreneurship—particularly, in the forms of “internal corporate 
 
104. See infra note 155 and accompanying text. 
105. See Ahjond S. Garmestani et al., Introduction: Social-Ecological Resilience and 
Law, in SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL RESILIENCE AND LAW 1, 5–6 (Ahjond S. Garmestani & Craig R. 
Allen eds., Columbia Univ. Press 2014) (“Ecological resilience is the amount of disturbance 
required to flip the system into an alternative state, whereas engineering resilience is the 
capacity of a system to absorb a disturbance and return to a stable equilibrium state.”); cf. C.S. 
Holling, Engineering Resilience Versus Ecological Resilience, in ENGINEERING WITHIN 
ECOLOGICAL CONSTRAINTS 31, 31 (Peter Schulze ed., 1996) (distinguishing engineering 
resilience from ecological resilience). 
106. See Hoffman & Jennings, supra note 9, at 12. 
107. Cf. Martha T. McCluskey et al., Law and Economics: Contemporary Approaches, 35 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 297, 300 (2016) (“[W]e need more, not fewer, accounts of how law can 
improve economic justice and economic policy.”). 
108. See infra note 118 and accompanying text. 
109. For a detailed discussion of the myriad practical, policy and regulatory challenges in 
right-leveling cooperative-community resilience, using the example of local currencies (i.e., 
community-based currency systems) as a key tool in building local monetary resilience, see 
Rohan Grey, Monetary Resilience, 41 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 505 (2019). 
110. See KENNETH E. PIGG, N. CENT. REG’L CTR. FOR RURAL DEV., RURAL ECONOMIC 
REVITALIZATION: THE COOPERATIVE EXTENSION CHALLENGE IN THE NORTH CENTRAL 
REGION 9 (1986) (using the term “community intrapreneurship” in order to discuss internal 
development or intrapreneurship strategies for community economic development in local 
communities). 
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entrepreneurship” and “social intrapreneurship”—is generally defined as 
entrepreneurship within an already established collective (group, 
organization, etc.).111  In its Old-French etymology (“entreprendre,” to 
“undertake”), entrepreneuring, that is, undertaking an enterprise, means to 
“take [matters] in hand,” often with a “spirit of daring.”112  Today, 
entrepreneurship (including so-called “social entrepreneurship”113 within 
the purportedly “new,” “sharing,” “platform,” or “sustainable 
economy”114) perennially overemphasizes the individual as the crucial 
driver of social change and progress—a visionary, risk-embracing, 
disruptive islander, surrounded by a sea of faceless and feckless wealth-
production drudgery, who ingeniously can hack the outdated and 
outmoded production systems and shift low-yielding productive resources 
into innovative, higher-productivity applications with greater yields, 
greater-concentrated private wealth, but also with the professed collateral 
benefit of greater welfare for all.115  What banal (and also dangerous) 
hogwash!  Humans are always “change agents,” hence, entrepreneurs and 
intrapreneurs all of the time.  We constantly have to be entrepreneurial, 
that is, creative, risk-taking and disruptive (if not, daring) in our personal 
lives and reinvent and redefine the boundaries and resource usage of our 
most precious “capital”—namely, our own limited life that with every 
passing day is a day further away from its alpha and a day closer to its 
omega. 
 
111. Olivier Basso, ‘Intrapreneurship’: Corporate Entrepreneurship Developing an 
Entrepreneurial Dynamic Within Large Businesses, in HANDBOOK OF TOP MANAGEMENT 
TEAMS 460, 460–61 (Frank Bournois et al. eds., 2010) (“[Intrapreneurship is referred to as] 
corporate venturing, corporate entrepreneurship or internal corporate entrepreneurship.”); 
Darian M. Ibrahim, Intrapreneurship, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1741, 1750 (2016) (discussing 
intrapreneurship generally); Paul Tracey & Neil Stott, Social Innovation: A Window on 
Alternative Ways of Organizing and Innovating, 19 INNOVATION 51, 53–54 (2017) (defining 
“social intrapreneurship”). 
112. Enterprise (n.), ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, https://www.etymonline.com/
word/enterprise (last visited Apr. 12, 2019); Entrepreneur (n.), ONLINE ETYMOLOGY 
DICTIONARY, https://www.etymonline.com/word/entrepreneur (last visited Apr. 12, 2019). 
113. Tracey & Stott, supra note 111, at 52–54. 
114. For general criticism of these rather delusional and misleading labels and their 
underlying commercial practices and realities, see generally Frank Pasquale, Two Narratives of 
Platform Capitalism, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 309 (2016).  For a critical account of 
entrepreneurship in the realm of community economic development, see Rashmi Dyal-Chand 
& James V. Rowan, Developing Capabilities, Not Entrepreneurs: A New Theory for Community 
Economic Development, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 839, 839 (2014). 
115. Cf. Joel Mokyr, Bottom-Up or Top-Down? The Origins of the Industrial Revolution, 
14 J. INST. ECON. 1003, 1003 (2018) (discussing how “small elites of intellectuals and 
craftsmen, what are rapidly becoming known as ‘upper-tail human capital’” were the principal 
drivers of “technological progress during and after the Industrial Revolution”). 
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Similarly, as intrapreneurs, we also constantly reinvent and redefine 
the boundaries and resource usage of human cooperation in our 
collectivized and organizationally-situated interactions with others—
namely, family, co-workers, neighbors, etc.—constantly “spot[ting] gaps 
between intra-[organizational] capabilities and extra-[organizational] 
societal needs.”116  Our ability to reinvent and innovate our cooperative-
collaborative world with others is dependent on the relational, communal, 
and institutional embeddedness of our personal action, thus, on our 
“intrapreneurial organizational ecosystem.”  Such ecosystem, however, 
has always been, at best, pedestrian.  We are mostly fortuitous 
intrapreneurs—reacting merely to external pressures.  We usually take the 
relative openness of our intrapreneurial ecosystem for granted and, 
essentially, deem it impervious to deliberate change.117  Accordingly, we 
rarely consciously cultivate our “synecology”—that is, our community 
ecology118—through systematic and properly scaled sociopolitical and 
socioeconomic innovation.  We rarely purposefully disrupt and (re)design 
the communal and institutional ground-level realms in which we try to 
better the aggregate welfare of our lives.  We rather leave it (indeed, 
delegate it) to distant, disconnected and anonymous others—usually, non-
profit governments distributing public goods and accumulations of private 
financial capital seeking profits—to provide for our collective welfare 
infrastructure and to distribute, inefficiently and inequitably, the benefits 
as well as the massive present and future costs of our common welfare 
production.119 
 
116. Tamara C. Belinfanti, Contemplating the Gap-Filling Role of Social 
Intrapreneurship, 94 OR. L. REV. 67, 69 (2015). 
117. Cf. Danielle Kie Hart, Cross Purposes & Unintended Consequences: Karl Llewellyn, 
Article 2, and the Limits of Social Transformation, 12 NEV. L.J. 54, 77 (2011) (footnotes 
omitted) (“[S]ymbolic violence . . . results when actors misrecognize as natural the hierarchies 
and systems of domination produced through the struggle within fields to determine legitimacy, 
and agree to play by the rules of the game as laid out for them.”); Athena D. Mutua, Introducing 
ClassCrits: From Class Blindness to a Critical Legal Analysis of Economic Inequality, 56 BUFF. 
L. REV. 859, 861–62 (2008) (footnote omitted) (“Th[e] ‘market,’ a complex system involving 
millions of participants . . . is . . . discussed as if it is a naturally occurring phenomenon, like 
water, or oil, or trees, one that is outside the control, creation, purview, activity, and even 
influence of human agency.”). 
118. See, e.g., EUGENE P. ODUM, FUNDAMENTALS OF ECOLOGY 8, 145–48 (W.B. 
Saunders Co., 2d ed. 1959) (distinguishing concepts of “autecology,” “synecology,” and within 
the latter, “community ecology,” and further discussing community ecology). 
119. Cf. Eileen Crist, Beyond the Climate Crisis: A Critique of Climate Change Discourse, 
141 TELOS 29, 55 (2007) (“The real problem—the industrial-consumer complex that is 
overhauling the world in an orgy of exploitation, overproduction, and waste—is treated with 
kid gloves, taken as given, and regarded as beyond the reaches of effective challenge.”). 
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So, one may posit that we have to put more emphasis on innovating 
our “social-capital synecology” and foster contrarian (if not, subversive), 
non-mainstream intrapreneurship from the middle-out—through personal 
efforts, within our own individual lives, and together with those whom we 
interact with directly and non-anonymously day after day.120  Much of 
social-capital research is concerned with micro-to-meso-to-macro 
transitions.121  In contrast, the “right-leveling” concern and focus here is 
with micro-to-meso and macro-to-meso transitions.  It is the meso-level—
the communal level of social capital—that bonds, braces, bridges, thus, 
organizes and embeds micro-levels (i.e., relational/group) and macro-
levels (i.e., institutional/social) of human cooperation.  Thus, assuming—
for the sake of this Foreword—that middle-out social engineering is a 
suitable way forward, how can we make more of it happen together?122  
Obviously, middle-out starts with every one of us.  We always create the 
small-scale differences in how we live out every one of our limited days 
and persevere in implementing small steps one step at a time.  Middle-out 
social engineering also requires smart tools and focused 
experimentation.123  Here, we are, at best, at the ideation stage.124 
III. LAW (AND LAW LEARNING) 
“We must . . . revisit law in its entirety to understand its role in the 
Anthropocene.  We must look at how our new condition is to be read into 
the very DNA of law.”125 
 
120. Thus, in starkest-possible contrast to mainstream “social intrapreneurship,” the 
middle-out cooperative-community intrapreneurship conceptualized here never “emphasize[s] 
[any] notion that [we] should treat social problems as commercial opportunities.”  Tracey & 
Stott, supra note 111, at 54.  For a detailed discussion of the role of consumer advocacy in 
addressing climate change and, therefore, as a means for affecting top-down social engineering 
in the regulatory space, see Elizabeth A. Stanton, Kitchen Tables, Board Rooms, and Other 
Potentially Disruptive Locales: The Role of Consumer Action in Carbon Emission Reduction, 
41 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 553 (2019). 
121. See, e.g., James S. Coleman, Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital, 94 
AM. J. SOC. S95, S98 (Supp. 1988) (“[T]he principal virtue of economic theory . . . [is] its ability 
to make the micro-macro transition from pair relations to system.”). 
122. See Rowan, supra note 10, at 449 (“The question of what [is to be done?] then is 
coupled with its more difficult, demanding twin: how is it to be done?”). 
123. Cf. Cooke et al., supra note 3, at 832 (“[D]iversity of social theory engagement is in 
many respects a strong point of resilience thinking, encouraging experimentation and avoiding 
dogma”); Hoffman & Jennings, supra note 9, at 24 (mentioning, only in passing, “consortia of 
organizations that can broker local experiments”). 
124. See Palsson et al., supra note 15, at 11. 
125. Viñuales, supra note 86, at 9. 
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–Jorge E. Viñuales 
Economic and political realms are characterized by power, scale and 
majorities, and efficiency and compromise.  Only the social realm 
introduces positioning126 (or social function or status), resultant moral and 
legal rights and responsibilities and, with it, authority, law and (in)justice.  
Political-economic governance is merely the means by which a human 
society constantly provides and replenishes a common good—for both its 
current and future generations.  In this regard, law is a fundamental 
example and element of the social.  A priori and teleologically, it is 
accepted as a necessary behavioral constraint to direct and engineer 
political and economic systems and the governance of social-capital 
organization.  Thus, law is a public good and a special form of social 
capital: it constitutes the formal bracings in the “cooperative infrastructure 
of our societies.”127  Law “bridges” the normative distance between our 
personal, social and political-economic spheres.  Law is also “one of the 
major technologies accounting for the Anthropocene; a ‘soft’ technology 
alongside the ‘hard’ technologies relating to energy, agriculture, 
chemicals, building, transportation, and others that seem to have captured 
most of the attention.”128  Accordingly, how can, should, and will law 
change in times of Anthropocenic disruption?129  Arguably, this is the 
 
126. See Tony Lawson, Social Positioning and the Nature of Money, 40 CAMBRIDGE J. 
ECON. 961, 963–65 (2016). 
127. Fehr & Gächter, supra note 49, at 167; see also Bruce Miller, The Place of Law in 
Ivan Illich’s Vision of Social Transformation, 34 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 507, 517 (2012) 
(quoting IVAN ILLICH, TOOLS FOR CONVIVIALITY 95 (1973)) (“The continuity of legal norms 
allows, even obligates, the participants in adjudication—the parties, the lawyers, the judges—
constantly to adapt these norms, or what Illich called the ‘social experience’ of our legal 
forebears, to our deepest present controversies.”); Robinson, supra note 34 (“When law has 
integrity, it is because it reflects profound social norms, shared in a society . . . .”). 
128. Viñuales, supra note 86, at 8; see also Grear, supra note 21, at 241 (“[L]aw in 
general . . . [is] unresponsive—at a fundamental level—to the ethical implications of the 
vulnerable embodied biomateriality of the living order.”); Robinson, supra note 34, at 13 (“The 
discipline of the law is deeply implicated in the systems that have caused the end to the 
Holocene . . . .”). 
129. Changes in legal social-capital norms often happen much faster than changes in non-
legal social-capital norms.  Unlike social mores, norms, customs, traditions, and institutions, 
most legal norms rarely “display a great deal of inertia,” Williamson, supra note 50, at 597, but 
are rather subject to constant metamorphosis—if only incrementally, yet, on a manifold daily 
basis.  Nonetheless, changes of legal norms, in general, have to be “officiated” in some manner 
or form in order to be socially accepted as legitimate and binding.  Accordingly, “th[is] rigidity 
of our current legal framework is not well-suited to [efficiently respond to] the complexity of 
social-ecological systems” and their disruption and transformation in the Anthropocene.  
Garmestani et al., supra note 105, at 11; see also Baker, supra note 91, at 582 (“Legal scholars 
can and must map new adaptive legal pathways to help aid the transition from an economic 
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largest, most-pressing question facing the entire legal profession today.  
But, unfortunately, legal science (as one of the social sciences) and legal 
practice think and discuss little to nothing in this regard.  Notwithstanding 
law’s special status and core functionality within social capital, any 
current academic or applied inquiry into legal implications of, legal 
responses to, and, in particular, legal social-capital erosion due to, 
Anthropocenic disruption is still, at best, nascent and timid.130 
A. Community Resilience & Law 
Today, for example, good business law advice becomes increasingly 
more specialized, thus, higher-priced and exclusive.  As any other social-
capital resource, business law advice is scarcity-manipulated and, 
preferably, sold to the highest bidder—usually for purposes of further 
maximizing already existing concentrations of private wealth.  Resultant 
profits then become used, among other things, for the future bidding and 
access to additional high-octane legal advice, geared, at all times, at 
minimizing private responsibility for an efficient distribution of the social 
benefits and costs generated—all justified by supposedly rational social 
choice, driven by an invisible-hand price mechanism, and resulting in a 
social meritocracy of entitlements without attendant duties.  The 
intellectual drivers behind this universal wealth-maximization nonsense131 
are our utopian political traditions that emphasize individual freedom, 
individual choice, and the autonomy and independence of humans as first 
and foremost private subjects with an innate right to chart their own path 
through life in order to attain a fuzzy, inherently non-permanent state of 
so-called “happiness.”  Granted, when (certain) people wanted to secede 
 
development paradigm rooted in neoliberalism, to a more dynamic law that recognizes the 
collective enterprise of existence in a destabilized world.”). 
130. See Viñuales, supra note 86, at 5–7.  A Google Scholar title search for the last decade 
(2009-2019)—conducted on February 12, 2019, with the search term “allintitle: 
Anthropocene”—returned approximately 4,760 hits for such topic.  Similar title searches on the 
same date and for the same time period (a) with the search term “allintitle: Anthropocene law” 
(i.e., both words in title but not exact phrase) returned only sixty-seven results, and (b) with the 
search term “allintitle: Anthropocene law -international -transnational -global -environmental  
-eco -ecological -ocean” (i.e., excluding international and environmental law dimensions) 
returned a mere twenty results. 
131. When wealth maximization has become its own end and, therefore, as simultaneously 
a means and an end, has no longer any purpose or goal and, in principle, can only refer to and 
repeat itself and keep maximizing until all resources are perfectly maximized and, therefore, 
perfectly annihilated (because once all natural and social capital has been converted into 
financial capital, the total(itarian) value of all financial capital is zero), there is, accordingly, no 
sense to be found in maximizing wealth.  Cf. Chen, supra note 4, at 754 (“The wealth of the 
Great Acceleration, as it happens, may be illusory.”). 
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from the British crown, they, of course, had to emphasize this irrational 
nonsense of militant individualism for the (paradoxical) purpose of 
building a collective political platform.  However, each of us, having been 
fortunate enough to live into adulthood, can easily attest that we all 
existentially depend on the kindness of both loved ones and complete 
strangers in everything we do every day.  We all live on borrowed time, 
borrowed beneficence and benevolence, and, most existentially, borrowed 
Earth.132  Accordingly, one could posit that a crucial objective in this realm 
for intrapreneurial law and law learning in the accelerating Anthropocene 
is to support both our “absorptive capacity”133 and our “adaptive 
capacity”134 for socially innovative, non-utopian ideas and practices that 
go beyond those principally fueled by their profit-orientation, at all cost, 
and their accentuation of the perpetually competing and utility-scheming 
individual, over and above everyone else.  Translated into the law-learning 
realm of business law and, in particular, of business organizations law, 
this requires a systematic shift of focus away from the protection of 
insatiable greed (euphemistically labelled “wealth maximization”) and 
insatiable power (euphemistically sanitized as “control”).135  It requires a 
shift away from the reductionist, “decollectivizing” and disembodied 
treatment of business organizations as lean, mean, money-making 
machines for a chosen few whom we deem worthy enough to be 
recognized in, and matter for purposes of, business organizations law, 
namely, the receivers of maximized wealth (owners) and the wielders of 
control (managers).  And it requires a marked shift and a lot of new focus, 
scholarly inquiry and, most importantly, teaching energy towards what I 
will call “focused protocommunal experimentation.”136 
Like wealth, law is a means, not an end in itself.  Its purpose is to 
enable people to organize their cooperation in ways deemed beneficial on 
both individual and collective levels of welfare organization and 
 
132. Cf. Hudson, supra note 38, at 942 (“[Humans] have known for some time that we are 
living on borrowed Earth—using more planet than we actually have available.”). 
133. See Wesley M. Cohen & Daniel A. Levinthal, Absorptive Capacity: A New 
Perspective on Learning and Innovation, 35 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 128, 128 (1990). 
134. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, General Design Principles for Resilience and Adaptive Capacity 
in Legal Systems—with Applications to Climate Change Adaptation, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1373, 
1388–89 (2011). 
135. Cf. Reich-Graefe, supra note 24, at 505 n.185. 
136. The qualifier, “focused,” is meant to signal that we have neither the natural nor the 
time resources for infinite, ever-spontaneous, uncoordinated, highly-replicative, trial-and-error 
experimentation.  We have to critically undertake legal and non-legal social-capital experiments 
“off mainstream,” but do so in “smart” (i.e., concerted, sophisticated and nonreplenishable-
resources-preserving) ways. 
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production.  Thus, business organizations law needs to resurrect and 
(re)adapt simple, balanced, and resilience-efficient tools—which have 
been almost lost in today’s specialized and “exclusified” realms of 
(business) law advice137—in order to enable and support middle-out social 
engineering and community intrapreneurship with as much organizational 
self-regulation and as little need for pre-association bargaining and 
governance customization as possible.  Here are three categories of 
“arable land” in this regard that have been left “fallow” in the business 
law orthodoxy for somewhere between five decades and more than a 
century: “new-old” forms of middle-out organization, particularly, 
cooperatives;138 “new-old” theories of middle-out organization, 
particularly, the ontological and philosophical foundations of associations 
and organizations of human (economic) cooperation;139 and “new-old” 
techniques of middle-out organization,140 particularly, as regards its 
 
137. See Baker, supra note 91, at 582 (“[A] radical break from modern law requires 
reviving legal precepts long buried under the weight of the neoliberal economic development 
project . . . .”). 
138. See generally Elaine Waterhouse Wilson, Cooperatives: The First Social Enterprise, 
66 DEPAUL L. REV. 1013 (2017) (providing an overview of the nature, governance and function 
of cooperatives).  The standard treatise on the law of cooperatives ceased publication after its 
fourth edition in 1970.  ISRAEL PACKEL, THE ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF 
COOPERATIVES (4th ed., ALI-ABA 1970).  As a parallel development, “it is particularly 
revealing that the emergence of a fully capitalistic legal subject in the form of the corporation 
was pivotal to the colonial development of the international legal order and remains a core—if 
not the central—feature of the contemporary global order.”  Grear, supra note 21, at 238 
(emphasis omitted). 
139. See generally Joshua Getzler, Frederic William Maitland—Trust and Corporation, 
34 U. QUEENSLAND L.J. 171 (2016) (exploring Maitland’s ontological, philosophical and legal 
comparison of the nature and history of corporations under English and German law).  The 
United Kingdom’s Partnership Act 1890—largely declaratory of existing British partnership 
case law at the time, the world’s first partnership statute, and the blueprint for the Uniform 
Partnership Act of 1914 in the United States—was based on a legislative bill drafted by Sir 
Frederick Pollock in 1879 and “has remained virtually unscathed through over a century of 
change” in the United Kingdom.  GEOFFREY MORSE, PARTNERSHIP LAW 10–11 (Oxford Univ. 
Press, 7th ed. 2010); cf. Viñuales, supra note 86, at 8. 
[T]o understand the role of law in the Anthropocene, lawyers would do well to 
look more widely at the laws shaping industrial organisation . . . . [and] should 
even go further and revisit fundamental legal categories, such as . . . 
‘responsibility/liability’, ‘legal personality’, [and] ‘corporation’ . . . to understand 
how they may have played (and may still play) a role in prompting and sustaining 
the Anthropocene as well as how they may be adjusted or perhaps replaced in the 
law of more resilient and more respectful human societies. 
Id. 
140. See Steven Ferrey, Anthropocenic Disruption in World Energy: Response of 
International Law, 41 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 475 (2019) (providing a detailed discussion of a 
“new-old” technique and model of middle-out organization in the energy sector, utilizing small-
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default “dissension management design.”141  To state the obvious here, 
focused protocommunal experimentation in (business organizations) law 
will only happen when law schools (re)start teaching (at least, some of the 
tools for) it. 
B. Community Resilience & Law-Learning Intrapreneurship 
Our (law) students, by definition, are future social engineers and 
social-capital resilience producers.  If we want them to engineer 
differently—namely, middle-out, not top-down, not bottom-up142—we 
have to teach them to engineer differently.  Focused protocommunal 
experimentation in intrapreneurial law learning, therefore, requires us to 
radically “de-mainstream” and bypass our current conventions of higher 
education.  The overall goal, here, is to create experimental, non-
institutionalized educational realms dedicated to community-learning and 
community-building for their own sakes, thus, rejecting the narrow 
utilitarian and neoliberalist professional agendas that regularly and 
arrogantly aspire to turn students, as everyone else, into “productive 
 
scale power purchase agreements for renewable power to foster renewable energy development 
in developing countries). 
141. U.S. partnership-law default rules provide for strong-form inter-partner and intra-
partnership fiduciary loyalty and a unilateral dissolution right for every at-will partner in order 
to (indirectly) address dissension.  The effect of such default dissension management design is 
that the partners have to keep everyone in their midst reasonably well-treated and sufficiently 
satisfied in order to continue the partnership.  Thus, in principle, partnership law forces partners 
to manage dissension in a way that supports a continued common-interest equilibrium.  In 
contrast, traditional U.S. corporate-law rules provide incentives to majority shareholders to 
opportunistically let dissension deteriorate and to benefit their personal interests at the expense 
of the minority.  Whereas partnership law is designed to “prop up,” stabilize, and protect the 
“common firm interest,” the design of corporate law provides opportunistic incentive to “tear 
down,” destabilize, and disregard the common firm interest post-investment and to expropriate 
economic rents from the minority.  For middle-out, communal-level dissension management, 
the much older, quasi-ancient partnership-law design is much more effective and “right-
leveled.”  See Baker, supra note 91, at 582–84 (“[There is] flexibility within contract law, [the] 
collective ownership of property[,] . . . [and the] develop[ment of] alternatives to limited 
liability forms and other business models that externalize the risks of their activities.”).  For a 
detailed discussion of why resilience frameworks and, in particular, their design are crucial in 
the context of effective regulation and sound regulatory policy (using the federal Farm Bill and 
the goal of nationwide sustainable agriculture as an example), see Laurie Ristino, Surviving 
Climate Change in America: Toward a Rural Resilience Framework, 41 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 
521 (2019). 
142. See DAVID LONG & ZANE SCOTT, A PRIMER FOR MODEL-BASED SYSTEMS 
ENGINEERING 13 (2d ed. 2011) (“Systems engineering can be applied to three classes of 
problems: top-down or ‘clean-sheet’ problems, middle-out or system-improvement problems, 
and reverse-engineering or system-replacement problems.”).  “With suitable approach 
variations, the systems engineer can address reverse (or bottom-up) and middle-out systems 
engineering perspectives as well.”  Id. at 24. 
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members of society.”143  In law learning, we are all a generation of learner-
teachers and current and future social engineers, who learn and teach, by 
either default or design—and who, therefore, can also be encouraged, by 
design, to cooperate and innovate from the middle-out and to 
systematically and prospectively help generate social-capital “meta-
resilience” (i.e., social-capital resilience tools that coordinate and 
intermediate the creation and maintenance of cooperative-community 
resilience).  There is no (nor can there ever be a) standardized, utility-
driven, a priori script and how-to manual of “meta-resilience production.”  
However, there appear to be certain cross-cutting precepts—moral and 
organizational principles144 of no particular order or priority, but of 
general relevance and applicability—that should inform the current 
ideation stage of community intrapreneurship and the side-streaming of 
(law) learning so as to better bestow robust and resilient social-
engineering forms, theories, and techniques of right-leveled law to our 
current and next generations of “law-tending” people at the dawn of 
Anthropocenic disruption. 
1. Self-Government 
Constituting communitarian forms of cooperation and collaboration 
in learning and lawyering, the power of learners here dictates, but rarely 
achieves, self-government.145  Self-government includes the power to self-
regulate (“by a ‘jurisdiction’ inherent in” the group of learners and by the 
group’s “agency, in the broad philosophical sense of a capacity to act 
 
143. From the “cozy” and “hard-earned” hegemonic midst and ideological hostility of 
such membership of self-proclaimed producers, its eternal deviant and subversive nemesis has 
long “been classified by the law as ‘a sturdy rogue,’ or perhaps, ‘an idle vagabond.’”  Bruce K. 
Miller, A Sturdy Rogue, 26 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 109, 109–10 (2004) (citation omitted) 
(quoting JACOBUS TENBROEK, FAMILY LAW AND THE POOR 205 (Joel F. Handler ed., 
Greenwood Publishing Co. 1964)). 
144. These principles are deemed necessary (in higher learning and elsewhere) in order to 
keep matters focused, balanced, consistent, honest, and immune to the many opportunities of 
corruptibility presented by the collective realm of human cooperation.  Cf. TAWNEY, supra note 
13, at 1 (“It is a commonplace that the characteristic virtue of [humans] is their power of 
sustained practical activity, and their characteristic vice a reluctance to test the quality of that 
activity by reference to principles.”). 
[In order to obtain] a clear apprehension both of the deficiency of what is, and of 
the character of what ought to be. . . . [one] must appeal to some standard more 
stable than the momentary exigencies of . . . commerce or industry or social life, 
and judge them by it.  [One] must, in short, have recourse to Principles. 
Id. at 2–3.  “[P]lenty depends upon co-operative effort, and co-operation upon moral principles.”  
Id. at 5. 
145. Id. at 7 (“[M]en should not be ruled by an authority which they cannot control.”). 
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rationally and legally as a unified entity”146), the power to self-govern (i.e., 
“the autonomous power to broker and settle internal conflict”147), and the 
power to self-enforce (i.e., to control power not in “justiciable . . . form, 
but [by] the moral idea that the wielder of public power does so for the 
Zweck [purpose] of public welfare”148).  The power and self-government 
of learners in “finding their own ways”149 should, of course, be supported 
by law teaching and, particularly, law tutoring.150  However, at its core, it 
must remain fundamentally unregulated by law schools and the “bean-
counting,” feudalizing corporatocracies of today’s legal-education 
mainstream.151  And it will require significantly more self-discipline of 
learner-teachers than currently prevails.152  In other words, law learning, 
both free-form and institutionalized, has yet to deliver, in a practical, non-
utopian manner, “the Holy Grail of political theory—how natural persons 
may create enforceable associations that guarantee cooperation and 
mutual help and do not become sources of coercion and oppression.”153 
2. Common Equity 
As non-proprietary, non-possessory, common-interest-based learning 
endeavors, no personal profit maximands of any sort may attain—other 
than learning-teaching and creating indivisible common welfare.  Thus, 
 
146. Getzler, supra note 139, at 188. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. at 189. 
149. See supra note 17. 
150. The etymology of tutoring involves the “guard[ing],” “look[ing]” after, and 
protecting of learners.  See WALTER W. SKEAT, AN ETYMOLOGICAL DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 669 (1882); Tutor (n.), ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, 
https://www.etymonline.com/word/tutor (last visited Apr. 12, 2019). 
151. See generally Lucille A. Jewel, Bourdieu and American Legal Education: How Law 
Schools Reproduce Social Stratification and Class Hierarchy, 56 BUFF L. REV. 1155 (2008); 
Harold McDougall, The Challenges of Legal Education in the Neoliberal University, 72 NAT’L 
LAW. GUILD REV. 65 (2015); Frank Pasquale, Synergy and Tradition: The Unity of Research, 
Service, and Teaching in Legal Education, 40 J. LEGAL PROF. 25 (2015).  As a result, 
intrapreneurial law learning in its communal application needs to follow a “de-mainstreaming 
principle.”  Cf. Hoffman & Jennings, supra note 9, at 19 (“Anthropocene studies must explore 
other, less prominent, voices, using means and channels that may lie outside the mainstream.”); 
see also Belinfanti, supra note 116, at 83 (“[I]ntrapreneurship is a private ordering [communal] 
activity that takes place in the absence of regulation or other legal directive.”). 
152. See, e.g., W. Barton Leach, Property Law Taught in Two Packages, 1 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 28, 30–31 (1948) (describing various qualities that law schools should help instill in their 
learners, including, as the final one, “pervading all [other qualities], and possibly the only one 
that is really basic: self-discipline in habits of thoroughness, an abhorrence of superficiality and 
approximation”). 
153. Getzler, supra note 139, at 188–89. 
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there is no (extra) money to be made, no (extra) academic credit to be 
gained, no promotions to be had, no officious titles or recognitions to be 
awarded, and no other reputational income or distinguishing and 
validating conspicuity to be generated154—all of which, in today’s 
consumption- and competition-oriented “educational markets,” is usually 
associated with personal “success” and professional “recognition,” and 
then inevitably touted in glossy-magazine law-school marketeering.  
Community is “everybody” together, constituting, ipso facto, the 
“common people.”155  And the essence of everybody’s positioning (or 
social function or status) within a larger collective purpose is that of an 
agent of, and within, indivisible, inalienable, and “team-productive”156 
common equity.  One “does not perform [the function] merely for personal 
gain or to gratify [one]self, but recognizes that [one] is responsible for its 
discharge to some higher authority.”157  Thus, “[i]n practice . . . , if 
[community] is to be healthy, [people] must regard themselves not as the 
owners of rights, but as trustees for the discharge of functions and the 
instruments of a [communal] purpose.”158 
3. Communality 
The goal here is to completely sidestep non-aggregated, atomistic 
self-interest, and to constantly develop communality and collaboration 
over separation and competition.  If we seek to encourage people to start 
changing their belief systems—in particular, to learn that we always have 
more in common with each other than whatever may separate us—we 
have to bring people together.  Our constant (non-)Bayesian updating159 
of what we believe makes the future predicable requires this to be an 
 
154. In other words, “resilience-engineering work” in Anthropocenic-disruptive times is 
work without external reward other than “maintenance welfare” (i.e., welfare that is the absence 
of current or future disequilibria changes). 
155. See Community (n)., ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, 
https://www.etymonline.com/word/community (last visited Apr. 12, 2019). 
156. For a discussion of the team production model, see, for example, Brian R. Cheffins, 
The Team Production Model as a Paradigm, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 397 (2015). 
157. TAWNEY, supra note 13, at 8.  In other words, serious “moral limitation[s] on the 
pursuit by individuals of their economic self-interest,” financial, reputational or otherwise, need 
to apply.  Id. at 14.  Accordingly, “success” is neither to be declared in the first place nor granted 
“to those whose existence is a struggle for self-aggrandizement.”  Id. at 49. 
158. Id. at 51. 
159. See, e.g., Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, Assessing Managerial 
Ability: Implications for Corporate Governance, in 1 THE HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 93, 153–54 (Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach eds., 
2017) (discussing Bayesian and non-Bayesian updating); Barbara A. Noah & René Reich-
Graefe, Rational Patient Apathy, 49 SETON HALL L. REV. 535, 583–85 (2019) (same). 
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experiential exercise.  For most people, it simply cannot be accomplished 
in a purely intellectual realm of abstract reasoning.  We have to bring 
people and their beliefs and, in particular, their residual empathy and 
kindness together—to help them not only understand but, first, even 
(re)acquaint themselves with the commonality of their human existence, 
therefore, their communality as living beings, therefore, their indivisible 
community in the first place.160  Communality and common equity in our 
communities also, by definition, create a body politic—not a persona ficta 
of legal organization—but a genuine realm of scaled-down political 
economy that we desperately need to stop neglecting.161 
4. Sufficiency162 
First-world modern humans are slowly witnessing the accelerating 
destruction of communal and social conventions from the very bottom up.  
In the past, we were still able to maintain open, empty, and thus, creative 
spaces of learning-teaching.  For the first time in human history, those 
spaces disappear as they are preempted by one detaching smartphone, one 
inoculating wireless connection, one alienating social-media account, and 
one single-minded professional video-gamer or YouTube-influencer 
aspiration at a time.  In our first world of technology dependency, 
everyone is now given license (indeed, is giving herself license) to act as 
a neoliberalist elitist and old-style capitalist—with an inalienable right, 
qua her existence, to exploit her community supports, and to treat her 
communal and social realms as both a cost-dumping ground on the one 
hand and a resource-pilfering ground on the other hand.163  Everyone is 
given license to treat her fellow beings as mere commodities that, 
depending on the opportunistic calculation of the moment, are either 
assets, impediments, or surplus to requirement en route to personal wealth 
maximization and evermore competitive aggrandizement endeavors 
aimed at appeasing instincts and exploiting insecurities.  In this shallow 
 
160. Accordingly, an essential “principle of universal solidarity” (and its profound 
recognition and pervasive practice) also applies. 
161. Of course, communality and common equity are part of a much larger “indivisibility 
principle” that recognizes not only the indivisibility of all humans, but also a planetary 
“indivisibility of humans and their environments.”  Angela P. Harris, Vulnerability and Power 
in the Age of the Anthropocene, 6 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY CLIMATE & ENV’T 98, 108, 137–
39 (2014). 
162. Cf. Robinson, supra note 34, at 21–22. 
163. Cf. Wright et al., supra note 90, at 460 (“For global business and political elites (and 
the economics, finance and management professions which underpin them), the Earth continues 
to be viewed as simply a source of natural resources and a sink for the disposal of our 
economies’ waste.”). 
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endgame, less is never enough.  Of course, less is also never more.  Even 
more is never more.  There is only one commoditization axiom: more is 
never enough.164  So, let less be ever enough.  Correspondingly, practice 
sharing and distributing accumulations of all kinds.165  Thereafter, keep 
practicing with “more of less.”166 
5. Subsidiarity 
No one can do any of this alone.  All cannot do any of this together.167  
Cooperative-communal space is innately of a non-centralized, non-
teleological design.  It is subsidiary to the particularizing causes, abilities, 
and needs of its specific participants and members—an organizational 
form that follows function.  Its design must even make allowance168 for 
“accidentality”—for the “blundering into wisdom”169 that is also our 
English common-law heritage.  Accordingly, there is no room for 
competition or selectivity (for purposes of access, inclusion, or the 
 
164. EPICURUS, THE EPICURUS READER 39 (Brad Inwood & Lloyd P. Gerson eds., 1994) 
(“Nothing is enough to someone for whom enough is little.”); TAWNEY, supra note 13, at 43 
(“They are never satisfied, nor can they be satisfied[;] . . . nothing short of infinity [can] bring 
them satisfaction.”); see also SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL, supra note 24, at 16–17 (“An attitude to 
life which seeks fulfillment in the single-minded pursuit of wealth—in short, materialism—does 
not fit into this world, because it contains within itself no limiting principle, while the 
environment in which it is placed is strictly limited.”).  Accordingly, the logical outcome is far 
from “pretty.”  See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, LETTERS TO A YOUNG CONTRARIAN 19 
(2001) (“Aspiring toward a consistent perfection . . . [is] aspiring toward 
annihilation. . . .  [T]he goal of . . . striving . . . is nothingness.”); CYRIL NORTHCOTE 
PARKINSON, PARKINSON’S LAW OR THE PURSUIT OF PROGRESS 85 (1958) (“Perfection, we 
know, is finality; and finality is death.”). 
165. That is, instead of wealth maximization, a “wealth-distribution maximization 
principle” applies (which aims to generate community welfare for the most recipients).  Cf. 
Thomas Kleven, Federalizing Public Education, 55 VILL. L. REV. 369, 369 (2010) 
(“[D]emocracy requires a principle of equitable sharing pursuant to which the goods and bads 
of social life must be fairly distributed among all society’s members.”). 
166. In other words, instead of wealth maximization, a “cost-minimization principle” 
applies (which aims to generate community welfare with the least external resources).  
Accordingly, there is also a subsidiary principle to use presently existing resources, that are 
currently available to the actor, and to prioritize resource usage from replenishable resources 
first, then renewable, to finally non-renewable resources. 
167. Accordingly, there are “de-concentration” and “de-centralization principles” at work.  
Cf. Farley, supra note 4, at 1189 (“As in ecosystems, resilience is enhanced via redundancy and 
via overlap at different scales of legal jurisdiction, with considerable decentralization that allows 
experimentation and failure at lower scales without undermining resilience at higher scales.”); 
Hoffman & Jennings, supra note 9 (“[I]n Anthropocene Society, . . . there will be more 
fracturing of processes and diversity in their expression.”). 
168. See supra text accompanying note 136. 
169. Frederick W. Maitland, Outlines of English Legal History, 560–1600, in 2 THE 
COLLECTED PAPERS OF FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND 438–39 (H.A.L. Fisher ed., 1911). 
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ultimate “neoclassical carrot,” leadership)—instead, everyone contributes 
based on ability.170  Likewise, there is no space for accountability or the 
institutional enforcement of “promises”—again, everyone is competent to 
contribute irrespective of others and of their conditional coercion.  What 
is the point of continuing to institutionalize distrust (also known as 
monitoring)?171  People who create this kind of communal space by 
thinking, learning-teaching, living, and finding their own ways172—by 
collaborating, but without the need to create limiting “network-effects” or 
alienating “we-identities” and, thus, without the need to exploit “targets” 
or stigmatize “nemeses”—understand that, at birth, this individual 
“portion” and promise called a human life has been endowed to them (for 
a purpose), never granted (as a right).  It has been placed in their care, 
never their receivership.  Human life neither competes for price nor prize. 
6. Omnicentricity 
The middle is everywhere—wherever we find it.  The possibility for 
middle-out social engineering is therefore everywhere.  In an ever-
expanding middle-out universe, everyone is a center.  No one is ever a 
synallagma173 of another.  The calculative ethics of reciprocity and 
mutuality—the Golden Rule,174 Kant’s kategorischer Imperativ 
[categorical imperative],175 Rawls’s veil of ignorance,176 or whatever their 
incarnation may be—always result in Hardin’s tragedy of the commons.177  
 
170. Cf. James G. Wilson, A Dearth of Kindness: Using Buddhist Psychology to Evaluate 
Rawls, Nozick, and Contemporary Corporate Ideology, 39 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 499, 533–34 
(2017) (“[A] social system becomes unstable or profoundly immoral if it fails to institutionalize 
the entire range of human motivations and/or fails to provide opportunities for the wide range 
of personality types that provide necessary diversity within human tribes.”). 
171. See Susan Verducci & Andreas Schröer, Social Trust, in INTERNATIONAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA FOR CIVIL SOCIETY 1453, 1457 (Helmut K. Anheier et al. eds., 2010). 
172. See supra note 17. 
173. A synallagma is a mutual, requiting obligation that is owed in return for an opposite 
synallagma.  Once consummated, both synallagmas cancel each other out—they (re)quit each 
other’s existence.  Thus, the ultimate utility of a synallagma lies in its extinguishment, thus, its 
end.  See, e.g., Mariusz Jerzy Golecki, Synallagma as a Paradigm of Exchange: Reciprocity of 
Contract in Aristotle and Game Theory, in ARISTOTLE AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: 
THEORY, PRACTICE AND JUSTICE 249, 249–50 (Liesbeth Huppes-Cluysenaer & Nuno M.M.S. 
Coelho eds., 2013). 
174. Marcus G. Singer, Golden Rule, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICS 614–19 (Lawrence 
C. Becker & Charlotte B. Becker eds., 2d ed. 2001), available at 
https://search.credoreference.com/content/entry/routethics/golden_rule/0?institutionId=5908. 
175. IMMANUEL KANT, GRUNDLEGUNG ZUR METAPHYSIK DER SITTEN [FUNDAMENTAL 
PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSICS OF ETHICS] (Riga, Johann Friedrich Hartknoch 1785). 
176. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); see Wilson supra note 170, at 506–07. 
177. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1243 (1968). 
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Now, we have reached its final chapter—an “Anthropocenic tragedy of 
the commons.”  Humanity only continues to survive because humans are, 
notwithstanding their often prevalent, preferred, and chosen social 
interactivity, irreducible to either reciprocals178 or mutuals179—quid-pro-
quos or quid-pro-quids of each other’s utility function of self-
aggrandizement and related social-capital predation.  Thus, the simple 
rule, neither “golden” nor otherwise precious or glittery, is that, instead of 
treating others the way we want to be treated, we need to treat each and 
every one better—consistently better and at every point of engagement—
than we would ever expect or want to be treated.180  This appears the only 
feasible way to compensate for the systemic freeriding that is our current 
post-postmodern state of “coopetition,”181 and, thus, the only way to 
create, in small middle-out steps, a common surplus of, at least, 
beneficence, if not, ultimately, benevolence. 
 
Therein is the tragedy.  Each man is locked into a system that compels him to 
increase his herd without limit—in a world that is limited.  Ruin is the destination 
toward which all men rush, each pursing his own best interest in a society that 
believes in the freedom of the commons.  Freedom in a commons brings ruin to 
all. 
Id. at 1244; cf. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, bk. III, pt. II, § V, 520–21 (L.A. 
Selby-Bigge ed., 1896) (1739), made available at http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/hume-a-
treatise-of-human-nature. 
Your corn is ripe to-day; mine will be so to-morrow.  ‘Tis profitable for us both, 
that I shou’d labour with you to-day, and that you shou’d aid me to-morrow.  I 
have no kindness for you, and know you have as little for me.  I will not, therefore, 
take any pains upon your account; and should I labour with you upon my own 
account, in expectation of a return, I know I shou’d be disappointed, and that I 
shou’d in vain depend upon your gratitude.  Here then I leave you to labour alone: 
You treat me in the same manner.  The seasons change; and both of us lose our 
harvests for want of mutual confidence and security. 
Id. 
178. While the homo economicus of economic modelling is strictly driven by advancing 
her material self-interest, homo reciprocans is already placing “direct utility value . . . on 
rewarding or punishing,” accordingly, also on being rewarded or punished.  See Thomas 
Dohmen et al., Homo Reciprocans: Survey Evidence on Behavioural Outcomes, 119 ECON. J. 
592, 592 (2009) (internal citations omitted). 
179. In a related biological realm, mutualistic bacteria (engaging in symbiosis that is 
beneficial to both participating organisms) have been aptly described as “favor traders.”  
Michael Pollan, Some of My Best Friends Are Germs, N.Y. TIMES: MAGAZINE (May 15, 2013), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/19/magazine/say-hello-to-the-100-trillion-bacteria-that-
make-up-your-microbiome.html. 
180. Fully collectivized, sociopolitical compromise in the common will now 
incrementally raise ceilings rather than continue to perpetually lower our social-capital floors. 
181. See generally Maria Bengtsson & Sören Kock, “Coopetition” in Business 
Networks—to Cooperate and Compete Simultaneously, 29 INDUS. MARKETING MGMT. 411 
(2000) (discussing the simultaneous practice of cooperation and competition in business 
relationships). 
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All of this, then, is a radical and urgent search for a “new middle,” 
thus, also a search for a new idiom.182  Anthropocenic disruption provides 
opportunity for a classic “third place.”  But it is an opportunity—or rather 
an inherited and daunting task—for only the “last generations of human 
modernity,”183 namely, our (law) students of today and of the very few 
next decades.  They must learn to “intrapreneur” and institute a resilient, 
“new-old” and “analog” bricolage for organizing, living, and maintaining 
pervasive forms, theories, and techniques of Anthropocenic community 
ecology184—and to, thereby, re-engineer, from the middle out, an overall 
sociosphere in which the “net return” of all human activity to social capital 
and to nature’s ability to replenish (thus, to absorb anthropogenic 
ecosystem costs) will always exceed the overall rate of socioeconomic 
“growth.” 
 
182. Cf. Palsson et al., supra note 15, at 7–8 (“Perhaps the most pressing task involves 
addressing the short-term and medium-term question of how to navigate the transition to a fully 
Anthropocene society during a period in which the prevailing social values and institutions are 
still those of an earlier epoch.”); Tickell, supra note 47, at 926. 
Little is more difficult than learning to think differently.  Yet, it is hard even to 
define the principal problems without upsetting longstanding traditions, beliefs, 
attitudes and the often unspoken assumptions on which we build our lives.  It took 
a long time for previous generations to accept the antiquity of the Earth, the 
mechanisms of evolution, the movement of tectonic plates, the shared genetic 
inheritance of all living organisms, and the symbiotic and to some extent self-
regulating relationship between the physical, chemical, biological and human 
components of the Earth system.  Some still reject the whole idea. 
Id. (internal reference omitted). 
183. Cf. Chen, supra note 4, at 770 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Isaac 
Asimov, Founding Father, in THEMES IN SCIENCE FICTION: A JOURNEY INTO WONDER 76, 81 
(Leo P. Kelley ed., 1972)) (“In humanity’s new and final chapter, we may yet lie ‘down to die 
in the midst of [our] victory.’”). 
184. Cf. Angela P. Harris, The Treadmill and the Contract: A Classcrits Guide to the 
Anthropocene, 5 TENN. J. RACE GENDER & SOC. JUST. 1, 35 (2016) (“The goal is to trouble and 
query the very terms in which we have been accustomed to think. . . .  We need new metaphors, 
practices, and institutions if human life is to continue in the Anthropocene.”). 
